Sunday, March 15, 2009
Over at the Mises Institute, Stephan Kinsella has made a post about Hans Hoppe's "argumentation ethics" case for libertarianism, and expressed his support for such an approach. The post also links to various criticisms of "argumentation ethics" ranging from David Friedman to Douglass Rasmusen. I find such criticisms to mostly be spot on. However, I prefer to critisize "argumentation ethics" in my own words, so I left some commentary on the blogpost thus:
"The fact of the matter is that the NAP, self-ownership and property rights
are not axoimatic in that they are not irreducable first principles. They are
derived from and intertwined with other principles. They cannot be reasonably
substantiated without reference to other concepts, and hence they cannot be
substantiated as axoimatic goods "in themselves".
I also went on to tackle the issue from the standpoint of the problem of "self-ownership" as a dualism:
I also cannot help but put foreward a problem I see with an ontological
concept of "self-ownership", as in the descriptive statement that "you own
yourself" or "I own myself", aside from the fact that it should not be conflated
with "self-ownership" in an ethical sense (I can ontologically have
"self-ownership" while being a slave). While there definitely is a lot more that I can say on this topic, this generally foreshadows what my criticism of axoimatic libertarianism in "Reconstructing Libertarianism" is going to be based on. While argumentation and purposeful action in general may be a prerequisite for rights in a sense, rights as such cannot be conflated with the act of argumentation itself. A systematic and specific libertarian conception of rights is not inherently implicit in argumentation - argumentation must be used to establish it. In fact, the moment that one goes on to formally make an extended argument, one has implicitly disproven argumentation ethics in that clearly one's premises have not been sufficiently proven by the mere fact that an argument is taking place. These are not necessarily irreducable first principles. Argumentation ethics, much like Stefan Molyneux's "UPB", actually ends up being a possible tool to hijack argumentation, as a sort of simple "driveby argument winner" that ignores the content of people's arguments.
Roderick Long left a short yet telling comment on Kinsella's blogpost:
"I accept universalisability, but I think it needs to be grounded in something; it's not a self-evident starting-point."In other words, while universalizability can perhaps be done through argumentation, the act of argumentation itself does not necessarily universalize anything. The value of universality itself has to be established through argumentation as well. We cannot just assume that our principles are universal by mere virtue of the fact that argumentation takes place. So there is a sense in which argumentation inherently must precede the principles. In the process of argumentation we may discover or make use of other principles. The principles are not a metaphysical given upon the mere fact that people argue, and they do not exist in a contextless vacuum.
"The fact of the matter is that the NAP, self-ownership and property rights
are not axoimatic in that they are not irreducable first principles. They are
derived from and intertwined with other principles. They cannot be reasonably
substantiated without reference to other concepts, and hence they cannot be
substantiated as axoimatic goods "in themselves".
I also went on to tackle the issue from the standpoint of the problem of "self-ownership" as a dualism:
I also cannot help but put foreward a problem I see with an ontological
concept of "self-ownership", as in the descriptive statement that "you own
yourself" or "I own myself", aside from the fact that it should not be conflated
with "self-ownership" in an ethical sense (I can ontologically have
"self-ownership" while being a slave). While there definitely is a lot more that I can say on this topic, this generally foreshadows what my criticism of axoimatic libertarianism in "Reconstructing Libertarianism" is going to be based on. While argumentation and purposeful action in general may be a prerequisite for rights in a sense, rights as such cannot be conflated with the act of argumentation itself. A systematic and specific libertarian conception of rights is not inherently implicit in argumentation - argumentation must be used to establish it. In fact, the moment that one goes on to formally make an extended argument, one has implicitly disproven argumentation ethics in that clearly one's premises have not been sufficiently proven by the mere fact that an argument is taking place. These are not necessarily irreducable first principles. Argumentation ethics, much like Stefan Molyneux's "UPB", actually ends up being a possible tool to hijack argumentation, as a sort of simple "driveby argument winner" that ignores the content of people's arguments.
Roderick Long left a short yet telling comment on Kinsella's blogpost:
"I accept universalisability, but I think it needs to be grounded in something; it's not a self-evident starting-point."In other words, while universalizability can perhaps be done through argumentation, the act of argumentation itself does not necessarily universalize anything. The value of universality itself has to be established through argumentation as well. We cannot just assume that our principles are universal by mere virtue of the fact that argumentation takes place. So there is a sense in which argumentation inherently must precede the principles. In the process of argumentation we may discover or make use of other principles. The principles are not a metaphysical given upon the mere fact that people argue, and they do not exist in a contextless vacuum.
Labels: Epistemology, Ethics, Hans Hoppe, Individual Sovereignty, Libertarianism, Philosophy, Self-ownership
Friday, March 13, 2009
Quibbles and Minutiae: Some Thoughts for Brainpolice
Since this is directly related to what's going on over here, I figured it would be worth reposting from Back to the Drawing Board.
Over at the Polycentric Order blog, Alex "Brainpolice" Strekal posted the beginning of a project he has undertaken to hopefully bring some order to the haphazard jumble of ideas currently living under the broad umbrella of "libertarianism." In this post, I just wanted to write up a few comments on the early goings of Brainpolice's work in hopes that they may be of some use for him.
Brainpolice has some interesting stuff to say about the history and genealogy of libertarian ideas. Since I'm not the most qualified person to give my opinion on those matters, I'll ignore many of them in these comments. But I will note that the account would benefit substantially from the inclusion of citations and references to other discussions which have come before his (i.e., Doherty's Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement, Boaz'sLibertarianism: A Primer, Murray's What It Means to Be a Libertarian, and Hamowy's The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism). I'm sure Brainpolice doesn't intend to write his whole book about the history of other people's attempts to talk about the history of the movement. But when trying to argue that a lot of people have gotten it wrong, it would be nice if he showed us a little more, instead of just told us. One particular instance where the conversation could seemingly benefit a lot from bringing in outside sources is the discussion of the early history of the liberal movement, where a connection to Hayek's discussions in "Individualism: True and False" and The Constitution of Liberty would make sense to me.
The first substantive issue I can take with Brainpolice's account is in his claim that liberalism and libertarianism are somehow built around the idea of "maximizing" liberty. This claim stands in opposition to the now foundational conception of liberalism and libertarianism as having at least something to do with rights which act as boundaries, rather than as goals to be maximized. I don't mean to suggest that I know that Brainpolice is incorrect about the origin of the term "liberalism" or "libertarianism," but it seems like it needs to be demonstrated that these terms have to do with maximizing liberty. And unfortunately, there is no such demonstration (yet!).
Moving on, an issue that strikes me as somewhat worthy of an expanded handling is Brainpolice's discussion of the roots of socialism. As I understood the history, Marx's thought was a direct outgrowth of the classical economists. And it seems clear to me that Marxism is more different from recognizably "liberal" or "libertarian" perspectives in its conclusions than in its foundations. As Cohen points out in Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Marxism is built upon something very much like the notion of self-ownership, and as I've discussed elsewhere on this blog, some of the core components of the Marxian system can be seen as the outgrowths not of a rejection of liberal ideas but rather Marx's acceptance of the labor theory of value.
Another issue arises from Brainpolice's claim that "...it is true that anarchism of some sort is the radical conclusion of libertarianism." Without agreeing or disagreeing with this statement, I just think it's obvious that justifying this claim would require a much more significant argument than the mere assertion offered here. That seems especially important in order to avoid making the paragraph sound like it's saying, "Some libertarians think anarchism is the real libertarianism, and others think that minarchism is the real libertarianism. Anarchists, though, can't reasonably kick out the minarchists due to popular usage of the terminology, even though anarchism is clearly the real libertarianism and minarchism is stupid."
Finally, I'm not sure if I'm the biggest fan of the structure of the chapter/essay/whatever it is. I think it initially comes off as being the very introduction that it claims not to be at the end, and might do better by moving some of the concluding material to the beginning, or moving some of the beginning material to later parts of the book where the lineages of specific ideas are discussed more in depth. If the purpose of putting some of the historical anecdotes in this portion is to illustrate how now-clashing ideas have been related to each other in the past, I would suggest that perhaps using more modern examples and ideas would better accomplish this goal (i.e., Murray Rothbard vs. F.A. Hayek or Ayn Rand, David Friedman's consequentialism, or Roderick Long vs. Walter Block), as people might be less hesitant in such cases to say, "Well sure Marxism is based on many of the same 18th century ideas as libertarianism, but that doesn't mean they're connected now," than they would be to say, "Well sure Block's thin libertarianism is based on many of the same 20th century ideas as Long's thick libertarianism, but that doesn't mean they're connected now."
But all in all, I think this was a good start, and I'm definitely excited to read more. I also want to commend Alex for starting this project; this is quite the undertaking, and I think it's fantastic that someone is trying to do something like this. Hopefully these comments will be of some help!
Over at the Polycentric Order blog, Alex "Brainpolice" Strekal posted the beginning of a project he has undertaken to hopefully bring some order to the haphazard jumble of ideas currently living under the broad umbrella of "libertarianism." In this post, I just wanted to write up a few comments on the early goings of Brainpolice's work in hopes that they may be of some use for him.
Brainpolice has some interesting stuff to say about the history and genealogy of libertarian ideas. Since I'm not the most qualified person to give my opinion on those matters, I'll ignore many of them in these comments. But I will note that the account would benefit substantially from the inclusion of citations and references to other discussions which have come before his (i.e., Doherty's Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement, Boaz'sLibertarianism: A Primer, Murray's What It Means to Be a Libertarian, and Hamowy's The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism). I'm sure Brainpolice doesn't intend to write his whole book about the history of other people's attempts to talk about the history of the movement. But when trying to argue that a lot of people have gotten it wrong, it would be nice if he showed us a little more, instead of just told us. One particular instance where the conversation could seemingly benefit a lot from bringing in outside sources is the discussion of the early history of the liberal movement, where a connection to Hayek's discussions in "Individualism: True and False" and The Constitution of Liberty would make sense to me.
The first substantive issue I can take with Brainpolice's account is in his claim that liberalism and libertarianism are somehow built around the idea of "maximizing" liberty. This claim stands in opposition to the now foundational conception of liberalism and libertarianism as having at least something to do with rights which act as boundaries, rather than as goals to be maximized. I don't mean to suggest that I know that Brainpolice is incorrect about the origin of the term "liberalism" or "libertarianism," but it seems like it needs to be demonstrated that these terms have to do with maximizing liberty. And unfortunately, there is no such demonstration (yet!).
Moving on, an issue that strikes me as somewhat worthy of an expanded handling is Brainpolice's discussion of the roots of socialism. As I understood the history, Marx's thought was a direct outgrowth of the classical economists. And it seems clear to me that Marxism is more different from recognizably "liberal" or "libertarian" perspectives in its conclusions than in its foundations. As Cohen points out in Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Marxism is built upon something very much like the notion of self-ownership, and as I've discussed elsewhere on this blog, some of the core components of the Marxian system can be seen as the outgrowths not of a rejection of liberal ideas but rather Marx's acceptance of the labor theory of value.
Another issue arises from Brainpolice's claim that "...it is true that anarchism of some sort is the radical conclusion of libertarianism." Without agreeing or disagreeing with this statement, I just think it's obvious that justifying this claim would require a much more significant argument than the mere assertion offered here. That seems especially important in order to avoid making the paragraph sound like it's saying, "Some libertarians think anarchism is the real libertarianism, and others think that minarchism is the real libertarianism. Anarchists, though, can't reasonably kick out the minarchists due to popular usage of the terminology, even though anarchism is clearly the real libertarianism and minarchism is stupid."
Finally, I'm not sure if I'm the biggest fan of the structure of the chapter/essay/whatever it is. I think it initially comes off as being the very introduction that it claims not to be at the end, and might do better by moving some of the concluding material to the beginning, or moving some of the beginning material to later parts of the book where the lineages of specific ideas are discussed more in depth. If the purpose of putting some of the historical anecdotes in this portion is to illustrate how now-clashing ideas have been related to each other in the past, I would suggest that perhaps using more modern examples and ideas would better accomplish this goal (i.e., Murray Rothbard vs. F.A. Hayek or Ayn Rand, David Friedman's consequentialism, or Roderick Long vs. Walter Block), as people might be less hesitant in such cases to say, "Well sure Marxism is based on many of the same 18th century ideas as libertarianism, but that doesn't mean they're connected now," than they would be to say, "Well sure Block's thin libertarianism is based on many of the same 20th century ideas as Long's thick libertarianism, but that doesn't mean they're connected now."
But all in all, I think this was a good start, and I'm definitely excited to read more. I also want to commend Alex for starting this project; this is quite the undertaking, and I think it's fantastic that someone is trying to do something like this. Hopefully these comments will be of some help!
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Introduction: What Is Libertarianism? (First Draft)
Note: This is the first draft of the introduction to the book I'm working on, which so far I intend to call "Reconstructing Libertarianism". I definitely will not be posting the whole book's material here as I go along, but at least the introduction seems like it could go here. I definitely think that this first draft of the introduction is not sufficient. It is in need for some elaboration and some references for a number of the claims made. For example, the part about socialism's relationship to classical liberalism could use a reference to Rothard from "Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty", and the part on libertarian semantics could definitely use a reference to Roderick Long's "xaxlebax" ordeal.
What is libertarianism? While the term “libertarianism” may be somewhat familiar to people who are interested in politics, in mainstream political discourse the term doesn’t seem to have much of a consistent meaning. Certain celebrities ranging from Bill Maher to Dennis Miller and figures more explicitly in the realm of politics such as Ronald Reagan and Noam Chomsky have used the term to describe themselves. The term has also been used to refer exclusively to the official Libertarian Party in America. In another context, however, the term is used more or less interchangeably with “anarchism”. With all of these different people coming from such widely divergent perspectives using the term “libertarian”, it should be no surprise that the general public may be rather confused or uninformed about what libertarianism is.
From a historical and philosophical perspective, the use of the term “libertarian” to describe just the official Libertarian Party is simply incorrect. The Libertarian Party in America was founded in 1971, and the political usage of term “libertarian” predates the founding of this political party by over a century. The first known explicitly political usage of the term “libertarian” originates in the journal of the French anarchist Joseph Dejacque, which was published between 1858 and 1861. Hence, in terms of its original usage, “libertarianism” is more or less a synonym for anarchism or an antonym of “authoritarianism”. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between a political party and a political philosophy, as membership of a political party is not exactly the same thing as adhering to a particular political philosophy. Another related distinction may be between libertarianism as a party and libertarianism as a social movement which is much broader than a political party. There are many people who identify as libertarians and yet are not members of the contemporary Libertarian Party, and some may even explicitly oppose the party. In fact, some segments of the libertarian movement are opposed to the very notion of party politics, especially those who identify as agorists.
In terms of geopolitics and culture trends, there is also a dual tendency of usage for the term “libertarianism”. In Europe, libertarianism is more likely to be affiliated with socialism or “libertarian socialism”. On the other hand, in America libertarianism is more likely to be affiliated with the party, or as having distinctly “capitalist” connotations. To be sure, this dual usage of the term between America and Europe is not absolute; there is certainly some overlap and alliance between the two. Nonetheless, it seems that the general tendency is for many European self-identified libertarians to consider American libertarianism a “capitalist” deviation and for American self-identified libertarians to often be largely unaware of any specifically European roots of libertarianism. This confusion is partially a matter of cultural barriers and disorientation, as libertarianism has come to be propagated and understood in a variety of cultural and historical contexts. Many areas of Europe do not share the same historical genealogy of ideas that America does, so it is understandable that such differences in interpretation may arise. In a sense, this difference in interpretation mirrors what has come to be the traditional distinction between analytic and continental philosophy, with analytic largely referring to America and the U.K. and continental largely referring to the rest of Europe. However, this analogy is not meant to be taken literally. It is not meant to imply that European libertarians are necessarily proponents of continental philosophy while American and British libertarians are necessarily proponents of analytic philosophy. But the general split in interpretation between European and American libertarianism certainly mirrors this dichotomy in terms of the geographical connections that it implies.
Despite these cultural trends and discrepancies, there is a base meaning for libertarianism in political philosophy, and the discrepancies more or less only come into play in terms of interpreting and specifying this base meaning. Viewed as a word, “libertarianism” clearly is derived from the word “liberty”. Likewise, originally the term “liberalism” was derived from the word “liberty” and was meant to signify a political philosophy that is primarily concerned with maximizing liberty. Of course, in contemporary mainstream politics the term “liberalism” no longer retains its classical usage and in modern political philosophy a distinction is made between “classical liberalism” and “liberalism” in its more contemporary sense. In the classical sense, liberalism was a movement coming out of the enlightenment in roughly the 18th and 19th centuries (although springing from roots much further back than that) which tended to radically rethink the nature of politics in favor of limits on political power and the liberation of the individual from many of the pre-existing power structures of the time, such as the church, the feudal system and the king. It is important to understand the history of classical liberalism in order to understand libertarianism because in many ways libertarianism is a logical outgrowth of it. The classical liberals set the tone or pretext for what has become known as libertarianism.
In economic terms, classical liberalism marks the beginning of the explicit formation of the notion of laissez-faire or a free market economy, reflecting a general trend towards favoring the removal of state controls on the economy. Some political philosophers started seriously pondering the question of how economic organization and interaction may take place absent any state intervention, and the field of economics began to formalize more. The historical context of classical liberalism is also centered on the transition into an industrial society and hence “the industrial revolution”, which in some ways ran counter to the interests of the old feudal and monarchical classes. The notion of a rigid class system in the sense of monarchy and feudalism was generally challenged by the classical liberals on the grounds of the monopolistic nature and their general threat to individual liberty throughout history of such systems. In contrast to the extreme centralization and monopoly that tended to be supported by the more traditionalist and classically conservative factions in political philosophy, classical liberalism represented a trend in the opposite direction, in favor of decentralization and “free competition” absent of any politically granted privilege. The notion of voluntary cooperation in the economic sphere, as opposed to rigid regimentation by law, became of central importance in classical liberalism. Skepticism and criticism directed towards the institution of the state generally increased and emphasis began to be placed more on economic organization independent of political powers.
Parallel to and overlapping with the phenomenon of classical liberalism was the beginning of the socialist movement. It would be a grave historical error to regard these two movements as mutually exclusive in any absolute sense. While classical liberalism more broadly dealt with concerns about political power, socialism more specifically dealt with concerns about the conditions of the workers and lower classes of society at the time and the existing privileges to various segments of industry. Both classical liberalism and socialism came about in reaction and opposition to the old political order, albeit perhaps from somewhat different standpoints. The ideas that came to be known as “socialism” in the 19th century have a prior historical root that is not entirely divorced from classical liberalism, which predates and may very well differ from Karl Marx’s works by quite a bit. Indeed, the use of the term “socialism” as being synonymous with state control over an economy or society is not exactly correct, especially in terms of 19th century socialism. That is a very modern, mainstream understanding of the meaning of socialism that lacks nuance and historical depth. Quite a few self-described socialists would tend to protest that there is a distinction between Marxism and other strands of socialism, or a distinction between “state-socialism” and “libertarian socialism”. Despite this, many contemporary American libertarians see the term “libertarian socialism” as an oxymoron or contradiction in terms, which partially is just a semantic and cultural issue due to different usages of terms.
Unfortunately, there is a lot of conflict among self-described libertarians over the meaning of terms such as “capitalism”, socialism”, “communism”, “left” and “right”. To some, “capitalism” is simply a term used to describe whatever social order results from liberty or an economy free from intervention by a state, while to others “capitalism” is synonymous with the state and refers to a specific type of political and economic system that is seen as inherently illiberal in nature. To some, “socialism” is a term used to describe “worker ownership of the means of production” or viewed as some kind of entailment of liberty, while to others “socialism” is synonymous with the state and refers to “state ownership of the means of production” or “state control of the economy” in a more general sense. Some take the view “communism” as a “stateless classless society”, while others view it as “the total state”. In addition to this, there are different views on the connotations of “the left” and “the right” and how they relate to libertarianism. This makes blanket usage of these terms rather misleading. Add “libertarianism” itself to the list of terms and the matter can become very confusing.
In some sense, libertarianism should be seen as distinct from all of these other terms, even though it may overlap with some of them depending on one’s usage of terms. In normal political discourse “capitalism”, “socialism” and “communism” all refer to specific political systems that may very well all be opposed in one way or another by libertarians, particularly in terms of their mainstream usages or connotations. In political philosophy, they refer to more specific ideas that cannot be conflated in any absolute sense with libertarianism. In a loose sense, libertarianism is an umbrella term that may refer to any political philosophy or movement that places a prime emphasis on individual liberty and in turn seeks to minimize or abolish power in some way, with various forms of anarchism at its most radical end and various types of “minarchism” or “limited government” doctrines at its moderate end. This is just about as inclusive and pluralistic of a definition for libertarianism that is conceivable. Unfortunately, some “minarchist” libertarians would consider anarchism to be an entirely separate category from libertarianism, and some “anarchist” libertarians would consider minarchism to not truly be libertarianism. To be sure, such an exclusively minarchist definition of libertarianism is historically inaccurate and an exclusively anarchist definition of libertarianism is divorced from the contemporary context of the term. And it is true that anarchism of some sort is the radical conclusion of libertarianism. But so long as there are people from both camps who use the term libertarian to describe themselves, for the sake of not dwelling too much on semantics it is convenient to use the term “libertarian” as an umbrella term. Whether or not a given person’s version of “libertarianism” undermines itself or has unintended consequences is an important question, but it’s a separate question from whether or not the term “libertarian” should be applied to them. With this being said, while we can maintain an umbrella definition for libertarianism, it is also important to specify different factions within the umbrella.
Libertarianism and anarchism probably has the most subcategories and philosophical approaches of any general political philosophy. This includes labels such as geo-libertarianism, paleo-libertarianism, neo-libertarianism, left-libertarianism, post-objectivism, libertarian socialism, libertarian conservatism, thick libertarianism, thin libertarianism, minarchism, agorism, mutualism, anarcho-capitalism, anarcho-communism, anarcho-collectivism, anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-primitivism, anarcho-pacifism, individualist anarchism, green anarchism, feminist anarchism, Christian anarchism, and post-left-anarchism. Philosophical approaches to libertarianism and anarchism may vary between things such as deontology, utilitarianism, egoism, post-structuralism, rationalism, neo-aristotileanism, and so on. Various schools of thought internal to libertarianism and anarchism have conflicted with each other and allied with each other. Specifying all of these factions and their relation to each other would be quite a tedious task and it is understandable why an outside observer of the movement would be intimidated or confused by such a complex network of people and ideas.
Nonetheless, it is clear that libertarianism cannot be oversimplified without us risking undermining any genuine clarity about the matter. While our umbrella definition of libertarianism as a set of ideas or movements focused on liberty and opposed to power may suffice for a short summary, it does not suffice as a serious and specific analysis of libertarianism in terms of political philosophy. It is still too vague in many ways because there are many different understandings of what liberty and justice are. Hence, it is important to trace out the specific ideas of various libertarians past and present and to understand how they relate to each other, where they derive from and what their implications may be. It is also quite evident that libertarianism currently has somewhat of a crisis in terms of its understanding of itself and it is highly fragmented into different camps. This is not to say that all of these camps are to necessarily be regarded as equal, but it is necessary to compare and contrast them and root out what may very well be incomplete or contradictory tendencies. Libertarianism is in need of internal criticism and it is in need of reconstruction as a consequence of such internal criticism. Perhaps some conflicts can be resolved with a synthesis and the elimination of false dichotomies, and perhaps other conflicts can be resolved by the dissolution of self-defeating or unnecessarily tension-creating ideas and the more specific clarification and elaboration on fundamental ideas. Despite the rather fundamental starting question of “what is libertarianism?” the purpose of this book is by no means as an introduction to libertarianism. It is meant to be an internal criticism of various elements within the libertarian movement and an effort towards the reintegration of libertarianism as a coherent political philosophy. Hence, it is generally directed towards readers who either are already involved in the libertarian movement in one way or another or already have a basic grasp of the fundamentals of libertarianism and take some kind of interest in it. Perhaps the fundamental question is not “what is libertarianism?” so much as “what should libertarianism be?”, since it is clear that many self-identified libertarians cannot even agree with each other on what libertarianism is or what it implies.
While there is a certain semantic element to the internal disputes of libertarianism, the disagreements are not always completely semantic in nature. Some people have rather fundamental philosophical disagreements over what liberty is and what it implies, with diverging views on what a free society looks like and what one’s ultimate goals are. In some cases, one libertarian’s “liberty” is another libertarian’s “tyranny”. There are also strategic disagreements over how to bring about goals that are more or less shared and over which political or social groups are worth allying with. These issues are not irrelevant and libertarianism will not meaningfully progress as a movement without some degree of clarity and consensus on such matters. This is not to say that libertarians are expected to be completely uniform in every way as individuals, there is plenty of room for preferential and semantic tendencies in the context of a basic foundation. But there is quite a difference between completely ignoring the problem or being indifferent to such conflicts on one hand and trying to resolve the problem and create cohesion on the other hand. The goal is understanding and consistency, a coherent foundation with which one can make sense out of libertarianism. Without at least somewhat of an effort to provide such a basic foundation and create consensus, I fear that libertarianism will fragment into obscurity and devolve into absurdity. In a sense I think that libertarianism needs to be “saved from itself” or reconstructed. So let us see what we can do to reconstruct libertarianism.
What is libertarianism? While the term “libertarianism” may be somewhat familiar to people who are interested in politics, in mainstream political discourse the term doesn’t seem to have much of a consistent meaning. Certain celebrities ranging from Bill Maher to Dennis Miller and figures more explicitly in the realm of politics such as Ronald Reagan and Noam Chomsky have used the term to describe themselves. The term has also been used to refer exclusively to the official Libertarian Party in America. In another context, however, the term is used more or less interchangeably with “anarchism”. With all of these different people coming from such widely divergent perspectives using the term “libertarian”, it should be no surprise that the general public may be rather confused or uninformed about what libertarianism is.
From a historical and philosophical perspective, the use of the term “libertarian” to describe just the official Libertarian Party is simply incorrect. The Libertarian Party in America was founded in 1971, and the political usage of term “libertarian” predates the founding of this political party by over a century. The first known explicitly political usage of the term “libertarian” originates in the journal of the French anarchist Joseph Dejacque, which was published between 1858 and 1861. Hence, in terms of its original usage, “libertarianism” is more or less a synonym for anarchism or an antonym of “authoritarianism”. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between a political party and a political philosophy, as membership of a political party is not exactly the same thing as adhering to a particular political philosophy. Another related distinction may be between libertarianism as a party and libertarianism as a social movement which is much broader than a political party. There are many people who identify as libertarians and yet are not members of the contemporary Libertarian Party, and some may even explicitly oppose the party. In fact, some segments of the libertarian movement are opposed to the very notion of party politics, especially those who identify as agorists.
In terms of geopolitics and culture trends, there is also a dual tendency of usage for the term “libertarianism”. In Europe, libertarianism is more likely to be affiliated with socialism or “libertarian socialism”. On the other hand, in America libertarianism is more likely to be affiliated with the party, or as having distinctly “capitalist” connotations. To be sure, this dual usage of the term between America and Europe is not absolute; there is certainly some overlap and alliance between the two. Nonetheless, it seems that the general tendency is for many European self-identified libertarians to consider American libertarianism a “capitalist” deviation and for American self-identified libertarians to often be largely unaware of any specifically European roots of libertarianism. This confusion is partially a matter of cultural barriers and disorientation, as libertarianism has come to be propagated and understood in a variety of cultural and historical contexts. Many areas of Europe do not share the same historical genealogy of ideas that America does, so it is understandable that such differences in interpretation may arise. In a sense, this difference in interpretation mirrors what has come to be the traditional distinction between analytic and continental philosophy, with analytic largely referring to America and the U.K. and continental largely referring to the rest of Europe. However, this analogy is not meant to be taken literally. It is not meant to imply that European libertarians are necessarily proponents of continental philosophy while American and British libertarians are necessarily proponents of analytic philosophy. But the general split in interpretation between European and American libertarianism certainly mirrors this dichotomy in terms of the geographical connections that it implies.
Despite these cultural trends and discrepancies, there is a base meaning for libertarianism in political philosophy, and the discrepancies more or less only come into play in terms of interpreting and specifying this base meaning. Viewed as a word, “libertarianism” clearly is derived from the word “liberty”. Likewise, originally the term “liberalism” was derived from the word “liberty” and was meant to signify a political philosophy that is primarily concerned with maximizing liberty. Of course, in contemporary mainstream politics the term “liberalism” no longer retains its classical usage and in modern political philosophy a distinction is made between “classical liberalism” and “liberalism” in its more contemporary sense. In the classical sense, liberalism was a movement coming out of the enlightenment in roughly the 18th and 19th centuries (although springing from roots much further back than that) which tended to radically rethink the nature of politics in favor of limits on political power and the liberation of the individual from many of the pre-existing power structures of the time, such as the church, the feudal system and the king. It is important to understand the history of classical liberalism in order to understand libertarianism because in many ways libertarianism is a logical outgrowth of it. The classical liberals set the tone or pretext for what has become known as libertarianism.
In economic terms, classical liberalism marks the beginning of the explicit formation of the notion of laissez-faire or a free market economy, reflecting a general trend towards favoring the removal of state controls on the economy. Some political philosophers started seriously pondering the question of how economic organization and interaction may take place absent any state intervention, and the field of economics began to formalize more. The historical context of classical liberalism is also centered on the transition into an industrial society and hence “the industrial revolution”, which in some ways ran counter to the interests of the old feudal and monarchical classes. The notion of a rigid class system in the sense of monarchy and feudalism was generally challenged by the classical liberals on the grounds of the monopolistic nature and their general threat to individual liberty throughout history of such systems. In contrast to the extreme centralization and monopoly that tended to be supported by the more traditionalist and classically conservative factions in political philosophy, classical liberalism represented a trend in the opposite direction, in favor of decentralization and “free competition” absent of any politically granted privilege. The notion of voluntary cooperation in the economic sphere, as opposed to rigid regimentation by law, became of central importance in classical liberalism. Skepticism and criticism directed towards the institution of the state generally increased and emphasis began to be placed more on economic organization independent of political powers.
Parallel to and overlapping with the phenomenon of classical liberalism was the beginning of the socialist movement. It would be a grave historical error to regard these two movements as mutually exclusive in any absolute sense. While classical liberalism more broadly dealt with concerns about political power, socialism more specifically dealt with concerns about the conditions of the workers and lower classes of society at the time and the existing privileges to various segments of industry. Both classical liberalism and socialism came about in reaction and opposition to the old political order, albeit perhaps from somewhat different standpoints. The ideas that came to be known as “socialism” in the 19th century have a prior historical root that is not entirely divorced from classical liberalism, which predates and may very well differ from Karl Marx’s works by quite a bit. Indeed, the use of the term “socialism” as being synonymous with state control over an economy or society is not exactly correct, especially in terms of 19th century socialism. That is a very modern, mainstream understanding of the meaning of socialism that lacks nuance and historical depth. Quite a few self-described socialists would tend to protest that there is a distinction between Marxism and other strands of socialism, or a distinction between “state-socialism” and “libertarian socialism”. Despite this, many contemporary American libertarians see the term “libertarian socialism” as an oxymoron or contradiction in terms, which partially is just a semantic and cultural issue due to different usages of terms.
Unfortunately, there is a lot of conflict among self-described libertarians over the meaning of terms such as “capitalism”, socialism”, “communism”, “left” and “right”. To some, “capitalism” is simply a term used to describe whatever social order results from liberty or an economy free from intervention by a state, while to others “capitalism” is synonymous with the state and refers to a specific type of political and economic system that is seen as inherently illiberal in nature. To some, “socialism” is a term used to describe “worker ownership of the means of production” or viewed as some kind of entailment of liberty, while to others “socialism” is synonymous with the state and refers to “state ownership of the means of production” or “state control of the economy” in a more general sense. Some take the view “communism” as a “stateless classless society”, while others view it as “the total state”. In addition to this, there are different views on the connotations of “the left” and “the right” and how they relate to libertarianism. This makes blanket usage of these terms rather misleading. Add “libertarianism” itself to the list of terms and the matter can become very confusing.
In some sense, libertarianism should be seen as distinct from all of these other terms, even though it may overlap with some of them depending on one’s usage of terms. In normal political discourse “capitalism”, “socialism” and “communism” all refer to specific political systems that may very well all be opposed in one way or another by libertarians, particularly in terms of their mainstream usages or connotations. In political philosophy, they refer to more specific ideas that cannot be conflated in any absolute sense with libertarianism. In a loose sense, libertarianism is an umbrella term that may refer to any political philosophy or movement that places a prime emphasis on individual liberty and in turn seeks to minimize or abolish power in some way, with various forms of anarchism at its most radical end and various types of “minarchism” or “limited government” doctrines at its moderate end. This is just about as inclusive and pluralistic of a definition for libertarianism that is conceivable. Unfortunately, some “minarchist” libertarians would consider anarchism to be an entirely separate category from libertarianism, and some “anarchist” libertarians would consider minarchism to not truly be libertarianism. To be sure, such an exclusively minarchist definition of libertarianism is historically inaccurate and an exclusively anarchist definition of libertarianism is divorced from the contemporary context of the term. And it is true that anarchism of some sort is the radical conclusion of libertarianism. But so long as there are people from both camps who use the term libertarian to describe themselves, for the sake of not dwelling too much on semantics it is convenient to use the term “libertarian” as an umbrella term. Whether or not a given person’s version of “libertarianism” undermines itself or has unintended consequences is an important question, but it’s a separate question from whether or not the term “libertarian” should be applied to them. With this being said, while we can maintain an umbrella definition for libertarianism, it is also important to specify different factions within the umbrella.
Libertarianism and anarchism probably has the most subcategories and philosophical approaches of any general political philosophy. This includes labels such as geo-libertarianism, paleo-libertarianism, neo-libertarianism, left-libertarianism, post-objectivism, libertarian socialism, libertarian conservatism, thick libertarianism, thin libertarianism, minarchism, agorism, mutualism, anarcho-capitalism, anarcho-communism, anarcho-collectivism, anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-primitivism, anarcho-pacifism, individualist anarchism, green anarchism, feminist anarchism, Christian anarchism, and post-left-anarchism. Philosophical approaches to libertarianism and anarchism may vary between things such as deontology, utilitarianism, egoism, post-structuralism, rationalism, neo-aristotileanism, and so on. Various schools of thought internal to libertarianism and anarchism have conflicted with each other and allied with each other. Specifying all of these factions and their relation to each other would be quite a tedious task and it is understandable why an outside observer of the movement would be intimidated or confused by such a complex network of people and ideas.
Nonetheless, it is clear that libertarianism cannot be oversimplified without us risking undermining any genuine clarity about the matter. While our umbrella definition of libertarianism as a set of ideas or movements focused on liberty and opposed to power may suffice for a short summary, it does not suffice as a serious and specific analysis of libertarianism in terms of political philosophy. It is still too vague in many ways because there are many different understandings of what liberty and justice are. Hence, it is important to trace out the specific ideas of various libertarians past and present and to understand how they relate to each other, where they derive from and what their implications may be. It is also quite evident that libertarianism currently has somewhat of a crisis in terms of its understanding of itself and it is highly fragmented into different camps. This is not to say that all of these camps are to necessarily be regarded as equal, but it is necessary to compare and contrast them and root out what may very well be incomplete or contradictory tendencies. Libertarianism is in need of internal criticism and it is in need of reconstruction as a consequence of such internal criticism. Perhaps some conflicts can be resolved with a synthesis and the elimination of false dichotomies, and perhaps other conflicts can be resolved by the dissolution of self-defeating or unnecessarily tension-creating ideas and the more specific clarification and elaboration on fundamental ideas. Despite the rather fundamental starting question of “what is libertarianism?” the purpose of this book is by no means as an introduction to libertarianism. It is meant to be an internal criticism of various elements within the libertarian movement and an effort towards the reintegration of libertarianism as a coherent political philosophy. Hence, it is generally directed towards readers who either are already involved in the libertarian movement in one way or another or already have a basic grasp of the fundamentals of libertarianism and take some kind of interest in it. Perhaps the fundamental question is not “what is libertarianism?” so much as “what should libertarianism be?”, since it is clear that many self-identified libertarians cannot even agree with each other on what libertarianism is or what it implies.
While there is a certain semantic element to the internal disputes of libertarianism, the disagreements are not always completely semantic in nature. Some people have rather fundamental philosophical disagreements over what liberty is and what it implies, with diverging views on what a free society looks like and what one’s ultimate goals are. In some cases, one libertarian’s “liberty” is another libertarian’s “tyranny”. There are also strategic disagreements over how to bring about goals that are more or less shared and over which political or social groups are worth allying with. These issues are not irrelevant and libertarianism will not meaningfully progress as a movement without some degree of clarity and consensus on such matters. This is not to say that libertarians are expected to be completely uniform in every way as individuals, there is plenty of room for preferential and semantic tendencies in the context of a basic foundation. But there is quite a difference between completely ignoring the problem or being indifferent to such conflicts on one hand and trying to resolve the problem and create cohesion on the other hand. The goal is understanding and consistency, a coherent foundation with which one can make sense out of libertarianism. Without at least somewhat of an effort to provide such a basic foundation and create consensus, I fear that libertarianism will fragment into obscurity and devolve into absurdity. In a sense I think that libertarianism needs to be “saved from itself” or reconstructed. So let us see what we can do to reconstruct libertarianism.
Posted by Brainpolice at 3:23 PM
Labels: Anarchism, History, Ideology, Libertarianism, Political Theory
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Love or Leave for the Greater Good
Originally posted @ LessGovernment.com.
--
Today I would like to examine two phrases that I lovingly refer to as products of the "lingual gag reflex." These phrases correspond to a series of sounds which are intended to convey some point, allegedly in opposition to ideas challenging a political status quo. In reality, however, even though the words are commonly uttered or typed with great conviction, it is quite difficult to attach them to anything coherent. For all intents and purposes, these lines truly are a lingual gag reflex, spewed passionately in the face of anyone who strikes a particular nerve but failing to rest upon any substantial meaning.
What are these phrases? I'll tell you:
The first phrase is commonly offered in debates between anarchists and statists. Depending upon the sophistication of the parties involved, it often takes the form, "Don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out." Also common (specifically in reference to the U.S.) is the heartfelt claim that citizenship is voluntary, therefore government is voluntary. Since it is voluntary, you consent to be governed by living here, and so on. Frequently, links to information regarding renunciation of citizenship are provided for the anarchists' benefit.
The statist who proceeds down this path of thought makes a number of errors, but I'm most concerned with one assumption. That assumption is the anarchist's consent to rule based on an arbitrary standard: existence. Being born on a patch of dirt equals implicit consent (i.e. implicit acceptance of the social contract), therefore claims of oppression are invalid in the absence of any attempt to renounce citizenship or at least leave the country. This assumption is ridiculous, of course, because any number of factors might be in play.
What is the "greater good?" Does the phrase mean anything at all? Since both terms require subjective value judgments, I don't think it's possible to arbitrarily classify anything as "good" and then dub it "greater" on some equally arbitrary standard. A woman being gang-raped is clearly in the minority. Is her plight for the "greater good?" Certainly not, I hope. There's nothing "good"at all from her perspective, in all likelihood, and it is doubtful that she will be assuaged by the "good" from her assailants' viewpoints.
"That's not fair!" cries the statist. "The woman is a minority in that situation, but the rapists are the minority in society."
Notable objection, and that might be true, but it only serves to highlight the arbitrariness. At what point is the line drawn? At what point does so-called "legitimate" majoritarian rule become so-called "illegitimate" majoritarian rule? One might say that society is the only majority that counts, but even then the majority is arbitrarily limited based on imaginary lines in the dirt. If the will of a majority makes "right," then it is arbitrary to claim that any given majority is exempt from this. A woman being in the minority compared to the rapists is no different than a tax-resisting individual being in the minority compared to the armed mercenaries at his door (and those who support and enable those mercenaries). Furthermore, a woman who "consents" to rapists in fear of her life might be accurately likened to an individual who "consents" to taxation in fear of his life, well-being and/or possessions.
Saying that someone consents to a proposition or action under the threat or actuality of violence does one of two things. It either renders the term "consent" meaningless, as something like consensual sex becomes such simply by one party threatening harm upon the other, or the term "consent" needs to be understood as a synonym for "surrender" or "submission." In fact, if "surrender" or "submission" more accurately reflects what statists mean when they claim someone "consents" to a government by existing under it, then I think it would serve for clearer discussion if they would use those terms instead.
So we're left with the "greater good" being a reflection of one arbitrary majority's will and the means by which they seek to sate that will, usually by compelling the minority opposition to submit or surrender under the threat or use of violence.
The problem here is that, even if the arbitrariness of defining a so-called legitimate majority is overlooked, there is no sensible way by which a government can possibly hope to accurately do the will of that majority. Governments cannot properly allocate resources, as Ludwig von Mises demonstrated nearly a century ago. How then can these same entities be expected to read minds and create rules accordingly? Interestingly enough, free markets and free association between agents serve as very good solutions to this problem.
So when these arguments come up:
--
Today I would like to examine two phrases that I lovingly refer to as products of the "lingual gag reflex." These phrases correspond to a series of sounds which are intended to convey some point, allegedly in opposition to ideas challenging a political status quo. In reality, however, even though the words are commonly uttered or typed with great conviction, it is quite difficult to attach them to anything coherent. For all intents and purposes, these lines truly are a lingual gag reflex, spewed passionately in the face of anyone who strikes a particular nerve but failing to rest upon any substantial meaning.
What are these phrases? I'll tell you:
"[My country]: love it or leave it. No one is making you live here.""[Oppressive Institution/Program/Policy X] is necessary for the greater good."
Love It or Leave It!
The statist who proceeds down this path of thought makes a number of errors, but I'm most concerned with one assumption. That assumption is the anarchist's consent to rule based on an arbitrary standard: existence. Being born on a patch of dirt equals implicit consent (i.e. implicit acceptance of the social contract), therefore claims of oppression are invalid in the absence of any attempt to renounce citizenship or at least leave the country. This assumption is ridiculous, of course, because any number of factors might be in play.
- The anarchist might lack the means to relocate himself.
- He might, as is increasingly the case in the slowly-militarizing United States, have problems with passports and other documentation.
- He might have a family that he cannot afford to relocate, or a family with members who have their own reasons for being unable to move.
- There are no anarchist commonwealths to which an anarchist might travel, so insisting that he "love" or "leave" the statist's nation is tantamount to a non-argument, an absurd claim meant to end discussion rather than offer a rational defense for the forcing of a system upon the anarchist. The anarchist might very well realize this and, by extention, realize there is no point in moving. Wherever he goes, people will offer the same "love it or leave it" demand when he objects to being tyrannized by their government. Even if one might be fully capable of renouncing his or her masters in some nebulous sense, doing so is likely to have no practical effect, as the renouncing individual will either still be subject to his former government due to land monopoly, or he will be subject to some other government upon leaving.
The Greater Good!
"That's not fair!" cries the statist. "The woman is a minority in that situation, but the rapists are the minority in society."
Notable objection, and that might be true, but it only serves to highlight the arbitrariness. At what point is the line drawn? At what point does so-called "legitimate" majoritarian rule become so-called "illegitimate" majoritarian rule? One might say that society is the only majority that counts, but even then the majority is arbitrarily limited based on imaginary lines in the dirt. If the will of a majority makes "right," then it is arbitrary to claim that any given majority is exempt from this. A woman being in the minority compared to the rapists is no different than a tax-resisting individual being in the minority compared to the armed mercenaries at his door (and those who support and enable those mercenaries). Furthermore, a woman who "consents" to rapists in fear of her life might be accurately likened to an individual who "consents" to taxation in fear of his life, well-being and/or possessions.
Saying that someone consents to a proposition or action under the threat or actuality of violence does one of two things. It either renders the term "consent" meaningless, as something like consensual sex becomes such simply by one party threatening harm upon the other, or the term "consent" needs to be understood as a synonym for "surrender" or "submission." In fact, if "surrender" or "submission" more accurately reflects what statists mean when they claim someone "consents" to a government by existing under it, then I think it would serve for clearer discussion if they would use those terms instead.
So we're left with the "greater good" being a reflection of one arbitrary majority's will and the means by which they seek to sate that will, usually by compelling the minority opposition to submit or surrender under the threat or use of violence.
The problem here is that, even if the arbitrariness of defining a so-called legitimate majority is overlooked, there is no sensible way by which a government can possibly hope to accurately do the will of that majority. Governments cannot properly allocate resources, as Ludwig von Mises demonstrated nearly a century ago. How then can these same entities be expected to read minds and create rules accordingly? Interestingly enough, free markets and free association between agents serve as very good solutions to this problem.
So when these arguments come up:
...I think it's fair to kindly inform the wielder that he/she is not making any sense."[My country]: love it or leave it. No one is making you live here.""[Oppressive Institution/Program/Policy X] is necessary for the greater good."
Monday, March 2, 2009
Philosophy or Action? Yes
Sometimes on strategic questions certain libertarians go along with a rigid dichotomy between philosophy and action in which one of the two is put foreward as the proper strategy while the other is generally denigrated. So the two basic default positions that may be concluded from such a rigid dichotomy is either that philosophy is of prime importance and revolutionary action is self-defeating and/or ineffective, or that philosophy doesn't really matter and revolutionary action is of necessity. This may be reflected in a negative sentiment directed at people engaged in conversation or debate that they are "doing nothing" or wasting time, or on the other hand it may be manifested in the brushing off of revolution as being inherently utopian in nature.
I happen to think that both of these premises are incorrect or incomplete and I find them to be annoying at their extremes. In my view, both philosophy and more concrete activism are necessary and synergetic. On one hand, it is important to be aware that ideas have consequences and hence that the outcome or general order of a given society is going to be effected by the ideas held by the people in it. A society dominated by archiac and authoritarian ideas isn't likely to be or remain a free society. Furthermore, engaging in the propagation of information could be seen as a form of action or activism, and without a coherant philosophy behind one's goal or a decent idea about precisely what one is trying to achieve, revolutions may be arbitary and counter-productive to a free society. The ends do not necessarily justify the means and the means may be counterproductive to the ends. "Action" for its own sake is irrational.
Yet on the other hand, a social philosophy is ultimately constructed in vain if there is no meaningful effort to actually bring its goals about beyond the distribution of texts and the general propogation of ideas in its favor. The propagation of a philosophy alone will not suffice to bring about the goals of that philosophy. One should strive to live one's philosophy as an individual and in relation to others. A social philosophy in particular inherently has interpersonal goals, particularly with respect to social organization, and hence social organization is necessary to realize a social philosophy. One can write until one gains arthritis or speak until they are blue in the face, but ultimately one needs to more directly or concretely create something and pursue goals. "Philosophy" for its own sake is irrational.
Revolution is both an intellectual and physical phenomenon, and hence there is an important revolutionary role for both the philosopher and the direct activist. Every new idea is in some sense a revolution in terms of its relation to tradition. Progress is not possible without deviation from the norm, both in terms of intellectual deviation and a more visible and concerete deviation. There would seem to be both philosophical and behavioral preconditions to the realization any revolutionary goal. The question becomes not one of philosophy vs. action, but a question of properly specifying goals, the reasons for thoses goals and the means towards obtaining them. The philosophy of action and the action of philosophy.
I happen to think that both of these premises are incorrect or incomplete and I find them to be annoying at their extremes. In my view, both philosophy and more concrete activism are necessary and synergetic. On one hand, it is important to be aware that ideas have consequences and hence that the outcome or general order of a given society is going to be effected by the ideas held by the people in it. A society dominated by archiac and authoritarian ideas isn't likely to be or remain a free society. Furthermore, engaging in the propagation of information could be seen as a form of action or activism, and without a coherant philosophy behind one's goal or a decent idea about precisely what one is trying to achieve, revolutions may be arbitary and counter-productive to a free society. The ends do not necessarily justify the means and the means may be counterproductive to the ends. "Action" for its own sake is irrational.
Yet on the other hand, a social philosophy is ultimately constructed in vain if there is no meaningful effort to actually bring its goals about beyond the distribution of texts and the general propogation of ideas in its favor. The propagation of a philosophy alone will not suffice to bring about the goals of that philosophy. One should strive to live one's philosophy as an individual and in relation to others. A social philosophy in particular inherently has interpersonal goals, particularly with respect to social organization, and hence social organization is necessary to realize a social philosophy. One can write until one gains arthritis or speak until they are blue in the face, but ultimately one needs to more directly or concretely create something and pursue goals. "Philosophy" for its own sake is irrational.
Revolution is both an intellectual and physical phenomenon, and hence there is an important revolutionary role for both the philosopher and the direct activist. Every new idea is in some sense a revolution in terms of its relation to tradition. Progress is not possible without deviation from the norm, both in terms of intellectual deviation and a more visible and concerete deviation. There would seem to be both philosophical and behavioral preconditions to the realization any revolutionary goal. The question becomes not one of philosophy vs. action, but a question of properly specifying goals, the reasons for thoses goals and the means towards obtaining them. The philosophy of action and the action of philosophy.
Posted by Brainpolice at 4:32 PM
Labels: Anarchism, Libertarianism, Philosophy, Revolution, Strategy
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