Tuesday, June 30, 2009
In a strict propertarian view, all rights are property rights (and likely to be treated as commodities-in-themselves). In my view, property rights are an extension of (and inherently constrained by) a more general right of personal sovereignty. A claimed property right that isn't consistent with respect for personal sovereignty in the first place is inherently null and void from my perspective. For a basic example, I don't think that someone loses their right to life and liberty as soon as they enter someone else's property - owning property does not grant one the legitimate power to murder and enslave people just because they are on your property. In this sense, the decision-making power granted by a property right is inherently not absolute.
If we do take the view that property rights are axoimatic absolutes, I think that this practically reduces all rights claims to meaninglessness because the absolute authority of a property owner can override anyone else's rights, leading to absurd scenarios in which aggression is actually being justified. It seems to me that property (including property as expressed in the concept of self-ownership, which I think is a propertarian misconceptualization of the right of liberty or personal sovereignty) is clearly not axoimatic or absolute in this way - it is constrained by respect for equal personal liberty in the first place, rather than being the foundation for the concept of liberty.
The fundamental clash here is between a conception of libertarianism in which the concept of liberty is thought of as being derived from property and a conception of libertarianism in which the concept of "legitimate" property is derived from the concept of equal liberty. The former conception tends to lead to "absolutist propertarianism", which is to say the notion that a particular conception of "property rights" is the foundation for everything else (even taken to the point of treating people as something to have exchangable property titles over) and the tendency to support absolute authority over other people based on territorial claims.
This is by no means a strictly left-libertarian vs. right-libertarian issue, since various aristotilean notions of libertarianism tend towards the latter view. Furthermore, there is an extent to which it is a matter of degree. While I do not strictly adhere to it (for example, I don't think that the NAP is an axoim and I don't use "self-ownership" as a starting point), I must admit that I find the Rothbardian conception of libertarianism much more sound than the Blockean conception. What it boils down to is that the Rothbardian conception is in some sense "thicker". Block adopts a sort of "libertarian legalism" that I think clashes with Rothard's notion of libertarianism.
While Walter Block talks about "voluntary slavery", Rothbard would have rejected any slavery contract as inherently being null and void due to inalienability. However, I think that both Rothbard and Block are mistaken to the extent that they treat all rights as property rights, only Rothbard shied away from some of the conclusions from this that Block would endorse (I.E. "voluntary slavery" in particular). What I'd like to point out, however, is that the whole "voluntary slavery" notion logically follows from the error of treating property as the starting point in the first place. In this sense, Block is more consistent than Rothbard, but he is consistently wrong, whereas Rothbard is correct to not endorse such conclusions but it remains a fact that those incorrect conclusions should follow from his view that all rights are property rights.
I see the issue of "voluntary slavery" only arising if one treats the concept of self-ownership as an exchangable property title, while I think that personal sovereignty is immutable and does not function exactly like a property title. I don't think it makes practical sense to concieve of rights as commodities in themselves; on the contrary, it seems to me that the function of rights would partially be as a pretext for having a freed market in anything to begin with. The opposite notion of an open-ended "free market in rights" being the pretext for rights seems to erode any consistency in the application of individual rights concepts and simply legitimizes whatever the whims of a territorial owner happens to be. In my understanding, individual rights need to be respected in order for the market to be free to begin with.
If we do take the view that property rights are axoimatic absolutes, I think that this practically reduces all rights claims to meaninglessness because the absolute authority of a property owner can override anyone else's rights, leading to absurd scenarios in which aggression is actually being justified. It seems to me that property (including property as expressed in the concept of self-ownership, which I think is a propertarian misconceptualization of the right of liberty or personal sovereignty) is clearly not axoimatic or absolute in this way - it is constrained by respect for equal personal liberty in the first place, rather than being the foundation for the concept of liberty.
The fundamental clash here is between a conception of libertarianism in which the concept of liberty is thought of as being derived from property and a conception of libertarianism in which the concept of "legitimate" property is derived from the concept of equal liberty. The former conception tends to lead to "absolutist propertarianism", which is to say the notion that a particular conception of "property rights" is the foundation for everything else (even taken to the point of treating people as something to have exchangable property titles over) and the tendency to support absolute authority over other people based on territorial claims.
This is by no means a strictly left-libertarian vs. right-libertarian issue, since various aristotilean notions of libertarianism tend towards the latter view. Furthermore, there is an extent to which it is a matter of degree. While I do not strictly adhere to it (for example, I don't think that the NAP is an axoim and I don't use "self-ownership" as a starting point), I must admit that I find the Rothbardian conception of libertarianism much more sound than the Blockean conception. What it boils down to is that the Rothbardian conception is in some sense "thicker". Block adopts a sort of "libertarian legalism" that I think clashes with Rothard's notion of libertarianism.
While Walter Block talks about "voluntary slavery", Rothbard would have rejected any slavery contract as inherently being null and void due to inalienability. However, I think that both Rothbard and Block are mistaken to the extent that they treat all rights as property rights, only Rothbard shied away from some of the conclusions from this that Block would endorse (I.E. "voluntary slavery" in particular). What I'd like to point out, however, is that the whole "voluntary slavery" notion logically follows from the error of treating property as the starting point in the first place. In this sense, Block is more consistent than Rothbard, but he is consistently wrong, whereas Rothbard is correct to not endorse such conclusions but it remains a fact that those incorrect conclusions should follow from his view that all rights are property rights.
I see the issue of "voluntary slavery" only arising if one treats the concept of self-ownership as an exchangable property title, while I think that personal sovereignty is immutable and does not function exactly like a property title. I don't think it makes practical sense to concieve of rights as commodities in themselves; on the contrary, it seems to me that the function of rights would partially be as a pretext for having a freed market in anything to begin with. The opposite notion of an open-ended "free market in rights" being the pretext for rights seems to erode any consistency in the application of individual rights concepts and simply legitimizes whatever the whims of a territorial owner happens to be. In my understanding, individual rights need to be respected in order for the market to be free to begin with.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
History and Social Evolution
There is an interesting history of what might be called "social evolutionary" ideas in political philosophy. This can be seen as being manifested in multiple ways, in the ideas of figures ranging from Karl Marx to Herbert Spencer. In the case of Marx's historical materialism, a social evolutionary theory of a sort is put foreward that predicts an inevitable linear historical trend towards a particular "absolute" (communism) and an analysis of history in terms of phases (such as "late capitalism") determined by "economic forces". In the case of Herbert Spencer's theories of socio-cultural evolution, the trend is supposed to be towards "industrial society" as opposed to "militant society" (although, unfortunately, towards the end of Spencer's life society was becoming increasingly both militant and industrial at the same time).
As a general rule, I think that social evolutionary theories are better at explaining the past than predicting the future. They can be useful as a historical analysis, but predictive claims made on such a basis tend to be dubious. A mistake that proponents of notions of social evolution may often be prone to make is to treat a particular ideal (communism, anarchism, liberal democracy, whatever it may be) as the ultimate end of history in a strictly linear sense, and as if such an ultimate end is "absolute" in the sense of being all-pervasive and/or unconditional. This is problematic because there simply is not merely one possible direction or outcome of history, and it seems to eliminate the role of people's actions in determining social and systematic outcomes.
Another issue is that it is not necessarily the case that social evolution is always "progressive" in a positive sense. It could concievably be regressive or even a cycle of both progression and retrogression. The view that mankind is inherently fated or predestined towards a particular utopia (which implies that it will occur regaurdless of what people think and do) seems naive. One's utopia is likely to function as a purely floating abstraction, and even if one's ideal is possible in some sense, this does not necessarily mean that it will inevitably occur without deliberate change in terms of human action and thought. If "the ideal" is treated in a fatalistic way, it would seem to follow that there is no reason for deliberate action or advocacy of such an ideal. On the other hand, if the matter is viewed more multi-dimensionally, it becomes clear that there are multiple tendencies at play that depend on a variety of factors.
Marx's historical materialism ends up functioning as a secularized version of millenialism or messianism, and Marx as a figure serves the function of a religious prophet in this way. Of course, Marx also faced the internal contradiction between such a prediction about the inevitability of the ideal of communism as the ultimate outcome of capitalism in a sense and his "practical" proposal for a dictatorship as a means to the ultimate end of the communist ideal, which the proof-by-demonstration of history has fairly clearly refuted. But insofar as what concerns us is the predictive part of Marx's philosophy, it seems quite evident that communism is treated as an "absolute" ultimate end in a way that mirrors platonism and judeo-christianity, and history is sweepingly described in terms of certain abstract phases that only seem to tell part of the story at best.
It should be clear that neither communism or anarchism are inevitable future stages of history. At the same time, it should be clear that modern liberal democracy is not eternal and is ultimately unsustainable. In fact, there really is no such thing as a permanent state of affairs or system or organization, unless there was a total statis and hence the end of time itself. The forces of traditionalism in general are likely to be futile in this sense. The claim of various post-modernists to "the end of history", even when construed as a metaphor for something more narrow, is not only highly dubious but it's ultimately an incredibly pompous notion that functions to close the book on anything other than what's already been established - a defacto defense of the status quo. The tendency to simply pinpoint a particular point in history as the end of possible progress is a manifestation of a certain conservative historical viewpoint that essentially defies the nature of time.
I think that it is important and healthy to aknowledge dynamism and multiple-probabalism. I also think that social evolution cannot reasonably be thought of one-dimensionally for this very reason. History cannot be explained let alone predicted purely in terms of one isolated factor, and as if it is somehow independant of individual action. All being considered, I endorse the general notion of social evolution (which is not necessarily the same thing as "social darwinism, but generally signifies the extension of evolutionary concepts to a historical analysis of social interrelations and dynamics), but advise one to err on the side of caution in terms of what they may be tempted to read into history.
As a general rule, I think that social evolutionary theories are better at explaining the past than predicting the future. They can be useful as a historical analysis, but predictive claims made on such a basis tend to be dubious. A mistake that proponents of notions of social evolution may often be prone to make is to treat a particular ideal (communism, anarchism, liberal democracy, whatever it may be) as the ultimate end of history in a strictly linear sense, and as if such an ultimate end is "absolute" in the sense of being all-pervasive and/or unconditional. This is problematic because there simply is not merely one possible direction or outcome of history, and it seems to eliminate the role of people's actions in determining social and systematic outcomes.
Another issue is that it is not necessarily the case that social evolution is always "progressive" in a positive sense. It could concievably be regressive or even a cycle of both progression and retrogression. The view that mankind is inherently fated or predestined towards a particular utopia (which implies that it will occur regaurdless of what people think and do) seems naive. One's utopia is likely to function as a purely floating abstraction, and even if one's ideal is possible in some sense, this does not necessarily mean that it will inevitably occur without deliberate change in terms of human action and thought. If "the ideal" is treated in a fatalistic way, it would seem to follow that there is no reason for deliberate action or advocacy of such an ideal. On the other hand, if the matter is viewed more multi-dimensionally, it becomes clear that there are multiple tendencies at play that depend on a variety of factors.
Marx's historical materialism ends up functioning as a secularized version of millenialism or messianism, and Marx as a figure serves the function of a religious prophet in this way. Of course, Marx also faced the internal contradiction between such a prediction about the inevitability of the ideal of communism as the ultimate outcome of capitalism in a sense and his "practical" proposal for a dictatorship as a means to the ultimate end of the communist ideal, which the proof-by-demonstration of history has fairly clearly refuted. But insofar as what concerns us is the predictive part of Marx's philosophy, it seems quite evident that communism is treated as an "absolute" ultimate end in a way that mirrors platonism and judeo-christianity, and history is sweepingly described in terms of certain abstract phases that only seem to tell part of the story at best.
It should be clear that neither communism or anarchism are inevitable future stages of history. At the same time, it should be clear that modern liberal democracy is not eternal and is ultimately unsustainable. In fact, there really is no such thing as a permanent state of affairs or system or organization, unless there was a total statis and hence the end of time itself. The forces of traditionalism in general are likely to be futile in this sense. The claim of various post-modernists to "the end of history", even when construed as a metaphor for something more narrow, is not only highly dubious but it's ultimately an incredibly pompous notion that functions to close the book on anything other than what's already been established - a defacto defense of the status quo. The tendency to simply pinpoint a particular point in history as the end of possible progress is a manifestation of a certain conservative historical viewpoint that essentially defies the nature of time.
I think that it is important and healthy to aknowledge dynamism and multiple-probabalism. I also think that social evolution cannot reasonably be thought of one-dimensionally for this very reason. History cannot be explained let alone predicted purely in terms of one isolated factor, and as if it is somehow independant of individual action. All being considered, I endorse the general notion of social evolution (which is not necessarily the same thing as "social darwinism, but generally signifies the extension of evolutionary concepts to a historical analysis of social interrelations and dynamics), but advise one to err on the side of caution in terms of what they may be tempted to read into history.
Monday, June 22, 2009
Anarchist and Socialist Semantics and Historicity (Or, Why Does Stephan Kinsella Act As If Individualist Anarchism Never Existed? Redux)
Over at his Austro-Athenian Empire blog, Roderick Long makes an excellent post in response to Stephan Kinsella's dogmatic anarcho-semantic insistance about the meaning of the term "socialism" (which was in response to a Kevin Carson post at C4SS).
These sort of "anarcho-semantic" battles are way beyond the point of being old and tiresome from my perspective. As far as I am concerned, it's an issue that is already resolved once one becomes adequately aquainted with the history of both anarchism and socialism in both overlapping and constrasting terms, and if one concentrates on the actual ideas that people have as opposed to one's preconception of the meanings of the often ambiguous labels that people attach to themselves. In this recent anarcho-semantics exchange, it appears that Stephan Kinsella is acting dogmatically in this regard, since he is refusing to recognize the distinction between his prejudice and other people's meanings of their terms.
The fact of the matter is that both "capitalism" and "socialism" have multiple meanings throughout history and across the nuances of the spectrum of political ideology, and that "anarchism" could be said to (1) have an ambiguous relationship with both of them and (2) be distinguished from and opposed to both of them, depending on the particular meaning used. At a minimum, it is more accurate to separate them both into authoritarian and libertarian senses, hence why some anarchists (myself included) have come to use the dual-terminology of "state-socialism vs. social anarchism" and "state-capitalism vs. free markets". As far as the history of anarchism goes, the distinction between anarchism and state-socialism was made most clear by Benjamin Tucker's writting "State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They Agree and Wherein They Differ".
Part of what is frustrating about some people's insistance on using a single meaning for these terms (and verbally beating those who don't use such meanings over the head with them) is that quite a few people simply cannot be single-handedly defined by either term when it comes down to the nitty gritty details of people's personal philosophies. Furthermore, the entire tradition of individualist anarchism in particular, which in some ways could be seen as a bridge between "social" and "market" anarchism, is neglected in the crossfire between the dogmatists of "both sides". There is a false dillema at play between accepting one side of the semantic equation over the other and between associating with "free market economics" vs. associating with "social justice" and "the left". This false dillema between choosing "the social" and "the economic" (and the modern cliches of "left" and "right") is arguably directly a product of mainstream media discourse, and to strictly choose either side of it is to be swayed by obscurantism.
The rigid meanings insisted on by the dogmatists simply break down. As far as those who act as if libertarian anarchism must be explicitly framed in terms of anti-leftism go, there is nothing about many of the social causes that are often associated with "the left" that inherently contradicts free market economics and individual liberty. Neither is there anything about worker-based models of buisiness that inherently violate the concept of free competition or free association. It inherently becomes a question of means, and insofar as voluntary and cooperative means are favored then there is nothing that a libertarian can principally object to. At best, a free market libertarian can only oppose such things on a personal level or out of pragmatic objections, but the idea that its incompatible with a free society by definition is simply wrong, and the idea that socialism qua socialism can be absolutely categorically separated from anarchism is so ahistorical as to be laughable.
As a matter of historical fact, anarchism was associated with "socialism" from its modern inception and the ahistorical term "anarcho-capitalism" did not come about until well over a century after anarchism had formally formed in political philosophy. As another matter of historical fact, "socialism" has never had a singular meaning. In the 19th century, "socialism" was a broad label that refered to numerous movements overlapping with, growing out of and splitting from classical liberalism. Numerous early 19th century socialists were associated with classical liberalism more than anything else and were often opponents of communism, and philosophical anarchism was initially the daughter of both "socialism" and "liberalism" taken to radical anti-authoritarian conclusions. The concept of "socialism" did not begin or end with Karl Marx, nor are Marxist and state-socialist doctrines the only currently existing types.
On the other hand, dogmatic anarcho-communists who more or less insist that anything other than a communist model for all of society is incompatible with anarchism and reject the entire tradition of individualist anarchism out of hand as some sort of "petite burgouesie liberal co-option" are simply being ahistorical (for one thing, mutualism and individualist anarchism predate anarcho-communism and anarcho-syndicalism by at least a number of decades). If one actually reads the writtings of anarcho-communists such as Emma Goldman, there are actually certain individualistic tendencies, and even Max Stirner-influenced or "egoistic" tendencies. Insofar as certain modern anarcho-communists want to aschew individualism wholesale, I think that they are actually fairly out of step with classical anarchist traditions. So the problem of dogmatism certainly cuts "both ways".
"Socialism" does not have a singular meaning. It could refer to "state ownership of the means of production" or "state ownership of property" and it could refer to "worker ownership of the means of production". These are clearly not the same thing: if the state owns the means of production or property in general, it should be clear that "the state" is not "the workers". Even the typical dichotomy between "public" and "private" property is highly dubious: despite the fact that it is often called "public", property owned by the state is clearly not actually owned by "the public"; at best, in actual fact it is controlled by an oligarchy or bureaucracy that grants limited access at its own discretion to "the public". "Private property" is also ambiguous, since it could refer to (1) a state-determined legal title to property (2) a territorial claim of absolute dominion (3) the product of labor and voluntary exchange and (4) any degree of exclusivity, at which point even a commune could be considered "private" in relation to that which is outside of it.
"Capitalism" does not have any more of a stable meaning in common political discourse than "socialism". If we want to be technical, it could refer to anything from the default condition of an economy in the absence of state intervention (at which point, all anti-statists would have to be called "capitalists", including social anarchists, which seems rather bizarre) to a minarchist state explicitly founded for the purpose of legally defining property titles to an all-out corporate state. By the very least, anarchists qua anarchists have historically rejected the latter two senses of the term "capitalism", with an anti-statist analysis that points out the role that state intervention played in the formation and functionality of modern "capitalist" states. Even as defined by classical liberal economists like Ludwig Von Mises, "capitalism" is a state system for the vague purpose of "protecting property" (I say that it's vague because that can mean many different things depending on what is meant or in terms of what actually occurs).
Typically, anarcho-capitalists will insist that "capitalism" is a stateless economy by definition (which, again, is a very ahistorical and minority definition of "capitalism"), and conclude that "state-capitalism is a contradiction in terms", deflecting all criticisms of "capitalism" on this basis. Likewise, various "socialists" (state-socialist and anarchist alike) will often insist that "communism" is a stateless classless society by definition, and therefore Stalinist Russia is not really communism. It's important to note that this manifests itself on "both sides": an ideal definition clashes with a definition based on the reality of the systems that are commonly called by those names. Hence, of course self-proclaimed free market capitalists are going to deny that a free market is the same thing as currently existing mixed economies (leaving aside vulgar libertarian tendencies, that is) and of course communists are going to deny that a totalitarian dictatorship is "true communism". In terms of the reality of the systems called by those names, manifested as state systems, anarchists qua anarchists are opposed to both of them.
Part of what this all come down to are unfortunate tendencies to be ignorant of other people's political philosophies, and apparently libertarians and anarchists are no less guilty of this than any other group. Indeed, I can attest to it on a personal level: when I initially became a hardline anarcho-capitalist, I was ignorant about the history of anarchism and I accepted a semantic paradigm that was unecessarily devisive and narrow. Then I actually did my homework and that semantic paradigm shattered, which lead to the collapse of various dichotomies and various cases of synthesis at the conceptual level. I ceased to think of anarchism as if it is a singular political system in and of itself (hence the discovery of anarchism without adjectives, which is the only thing that could be considered "the true plumb-line"). On the other hand, my understanding of libertarianism was enriched by the potential conceptual reconcilations with "the left" (and yes, "socialism") that can occur once such a rigid paradigm gives way to one with more depth.
These sort of "anarcho-semantic" battles are way beyond the point of being old and tiresome from my perspective. As far as I am concerned, it's an issue that is already resolved once one becomes adequately aquainted with the history of both anarchism and socialism in both overlapping and constrasting terms, and if one concentrates on the actual ideas that people have as opposed to one's preconception of the meanings of the often ambiguous labels that people attach to themselves. In this recent anarcho-semantics exchange, it appears that Stephan Kinsella is acting dogmatically in this regard, since he is refusing to recognize the distinction between his prejudice and other people's meanings of their terms.
The fact of the matter is that both "capitalism" and "socialism" have multiple meanings throughout history and across the nuances of the spectrum of political ideology, and that "anarchism" could be said to (1) have an ambiguous relationship with both of them and (2) be distinguished from and opposed to both of them, depending on the particular meaning used. At a minimum, it is more accurate to separate them both into authoritarian and libertarian senses, hence why some anarchists (myself included) have come to use the dual-terminology of "state-socialism vs. social anarchism" and "state-capitalism vs. free markets". As far as the history of anarchism goes, the distinction between anarchism and state-socialism was made most clear by Benjamin Tucker's writting "State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They Agree and Wherein They Differ".
Part of what is frustrating about some people's insistance on using a single meaning for these terms (and verbally beating those who don't use such meanings over the head with them) is that quite a few people simply cannot be single-handedly defined by either term when it comes down to the nitty gritty details of people's personal philosophies. Furthermore, the entire tradition of individualist anarchism in particular, which in some ways could be seen as a bridge between "social" and "market" anarchism, is neglected in the crossfire between the dogmatists of "both sides". There is a false dillema at play between accepting one side of the semantic equation over the other and between associating with "free market economics" vs. associating with "social justice" and "the left". This false dillema between choosing "the social" and "the economic" (and the modern cliches of "left" and "right") is arguably directly a product of mainstream media discourse, and to strictly choose either side of it is to be swayed by obscurantism.
The rigid meanings insisted on by the dogmatists simply break down. As far as those who act as if libertarian anarchism must be explicitly framed in terms of anti-leftism go, there is nothing about many of the social causes that are often associated with "the left" that inherently contradicts free market economics and individual liberty. Neither is there anything about worker-based models of buisiness that inherently violate the concept of free competition or free association. It inherently becomes a question of means, and insofar as voluntary and cooperative means are favored then there is nothing that a libertarian can principally object to. At best, a free market libertarian can only oppose such things on a personal level or out of pragmatic objections, but the idea that its incompatible with a free society by definition is simply wrong, and the idea that socialism qua socialism can be absolutely categorically separated from anarchism is so ahistorical as to be laughable.
As a matter of historical fact, anarchism was associated with "socialism" from its modern inception and the ahistorical term "anarcho-capitalism" did not come about until well over a century after anarchism had formally formed in political philosophy. As another matter of historical fact, "socialism" has never had a singular meaning. In the 19th century, "socialism" was a broad label that refered to numerous movements overlapping with, growing out of and splitting from classical liberalism. Numerous early 19th century socialists were associated with classical liberalism more than anything else and were often opponents of communism, and philosophical anarchism was initially the daughter of both "socialism" and "liberalism" taken to radical anti-authoritarian conclusions. The concept of "socialism" did not begin or end with Karl Marx, nor are Marxist and state-socialist doctrines the only currently existing types.
On the other hand, dogmatic anarcho-communists who more or less insist that anything other than a communist model for all of society is incompatible with anarchism and reject the entire tradition of individualist anarchism out of hand as some sort of "petite burgouesie liberal co-option" are simply being ahistorical (for one thing, mutualism and individualist anarchism predate anarcho-communism and anarcho-syndicalism by at least a number of decades). If one actually reads the writtings of anarcho-communists such as Emma Goldman, there are actually certain individualistic tendencies, and even Max Stirner-influenced or "egoistic" tendencies. Insofar as certain modern anarcho-communists want to aschew individualism wholesale, I think that they are actually fairly out of step with classical anarchist traditions. So the problem of dogmatism certainly cuts "both ways".
"Socialism" does not have a singular meaning. It could refer to "state ownership of the means of production" or "state ownership of property" and it could refer to "worker ownership of the means of production". These are clearly not the same thing: if the state owns the means of production or property in general, it should be clear that "the state" is not "the workers". Even the typical dichotomy between "public" and "private" property is highly dubious: despite the fact that it is often called "public", property owned by the state is clearly not actually owned by "the public"; at best, in actual fact it is controlled by an oligarchy or bureaucracy that grants limited access at its own discretion to "the public". "Private property" is also ambiguous, since it could refer to (1) a state-determined legal title to property (2) a territorial claim of absolute dominion (3) the product of labor and voluntary exchange and (4) any degree of exclusivity, at which point even a commune could be considered "private" in relation to that which is outside of it.
"Capitalism" does not have any more of a stable meaning in common political discourse than "socialism". If we want to be technical, it could refer to anything from the default condition of an economy in the absence of state intervention (at which point, all anti-statists would have to be called "capitalists", including social anarchists, which seems rather bizarre) to a minarchist state explicitly founded for the purpose of legally defining property titles to an all-out corporate state. By the very least, anarchists qua anarchists have historically rejected the latter two senses of the term "capitalism", with an anti-statist analysis that points out the role that state intervention played in the formation and functionality of modern "capitalist" states. Even as defined by classical liberal economists like Ludwig Von Mises, "capitalism" is a state system for the vague purpose of "protecting property" (I say that it's vague because that can mean many different things depending on what is meant or in terms of what actually occurs).
Typically, anarcho-capitalists will insist that "capitalism" is a stateless economy by definition (which, again, is a very ahistorical and minority definition of "capitalism"), and conclude that "state-capitalism is a contradiction in terms", deflecting all criticisms of "capitalism" on this basis. Likewise, various "socialists" (state-socialist and anarchist alike) will often insist that "communism" is a stateless classless society by definition, and therefore Stalinist Russia is not really communism. It's important to note that this manifests itself on "both sides": an ideal definition clashes with a definition based on the reality of the systems that are commonly called by those names. Hence, of course self-proclaimed free market capitalists are going to deny that a free market is the same thing as currently existing mixed economies (leaving aside vulgar libertarian tendencies, that is) and of course communists are going to deny that a totalitarian dictatorship is "true communism". In terms of the reality of the systems called by those names, manifested as state systems, anarchists qua anarchists are opposed to both of them.
Part of what this all come down to are unfortunate tendencies to be ignorant of other people's political philosophies, and apparently libertarians and anarchists are no less guilty of this than any other group. Indeed, I can attest to it on a personal level: when I initially became a hardline anarcho-capitalist, I was ignorant about the history of anarchism and I accepted a semantic paradigm that was unecessarily devisive and narrow. Then I actually did my homework and that semantic paradigm shattered, which lead to the collapse of various dichotomies and various cases of synthesis at the conceptual level. I ceased to think of anarchism as if it is a singular political system in and of itself (hence the discovery of anarchism without adjectives, which is the only thing that could be considered "the true plumb-line"). On the other hand, my understanding of libertarianism was enriched by the potential conceptual reconcilations with "the left" (and yes, "socialism") that can occur once such a rigid paradigm gives way to one with more depth.
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
In Defense Of "Radical Politics"
Due to a number of recent events of small-scale violence done in the name of politics, a media hysteria has apparently started to develope over what is labeled as "radical politics". To be sure, the events that the media has reacted to are certainly tragic and I oppose the views and acts in question. However, the blanket use of the category of "radical politics" is problematic. It begs the question of what "radical politics" is supposed to be contrasted from ("moderate politics" or "mainstream politics"?). The way that the term is used in the media, it seems to essentially signify and constitute a blanket dismissal of anything that is outside of the underlying consensus of mainstream centrist politics - and mainstream politics is indeed inherently centrist and conservative in the sense of being resistant to any meaningful structural or systematic change.
"Radical politics" is also generally meant to signify random acts of violence, but it would be misleading to conflate "views outside the mainstream" with random acts of violence per se, especially to conflate anti-governmental sentiments with violence. It is problematic to hype up random acts of violence or what's now being called "domestic terrorism" by implying a causal relation between holding views that are outside of the mainstream and supporting or engaging in random acts of violence. Furthermore, it is not as if mainstream politics is non-violent when one considers the policies and methods of control that exist at the institutional level. The democratic process might be nominally non-violent in a sense, but in truth mainstream politics is a matter of institutional violence. It is misleading to contrast small-scale acts of violence by citizens with the presumption of a peaceful system, which cloaks violence at the institutional level.
There is nothing inherently wrong with holding political views that are outside of the mainstream, and it may often actually be a virtue to do so. What matters is not whether or not one's views are within the mainstream, but what the quality and validity of such views are, taken on their own merits. The way that the media tends to talk about "radical politics", one gets the impression that it serves the function of reinforcing a certain bias against views that are not within the narrow confines of centrist precedent on the basis of ad populum logic - it is a discouragement of large-scale and structural-level changes and criticisms of the system. While the random acts of violence commited by various fringe groups are not to be condoned, neither should they be seized upon as an oppurtunity to politisize the matter and function as a blanket condemnation of "radical politics" (which does not just include the various wrong-headed groups associated with such acts of violence, but peaceful and sensible political groups outside of the mainstream).
"Radical politics" is also generally meant to signify random acts of violence, but it would be misleading to conflate "views outside the mainstream" with random acts of violence per se, especially to conflate anti-governmental sentiments with violence. It is problematic to hype up random acts of violence or what's now being called "domestic terrorism" by implying a causal relation between holding views that are outside of the mainstream and supporting or engaging in random acts of violence. Furthermore, it is not as if mainstream politics is non-violent when one considers the policies and methods of control that exist at the institutional level. The democratic process might be nominally non-violent in a sense, but in truth mainstream politics is a matter of institutional violence. It is misleading to contrast small-scale acts of violence by citizens with the presumption of a peaceful system, which cloaks violence at the institutional level.
There is nothing inherently wrong with holding political views that are outside of the mainstream, and it may often actually be a virtue to do so. What matters is not whether or not one's views are within the mainstream, but what the quality and validity of such views are, taken on their own merits. The way that the media tends to talk about "radical politics", one gets the impression that it serves the function of reinforcing a certain bias against views that are not within the narrow confines of centrist precedent on the basis of ad populum logic - it is a discouragement of large-scale and structural-level changes and criticisms of the system. While the random acts of violence commited by various fringe groups are not to be condoned, neither should they be seized upon as an oppurtunity to politisize the matter and function as a blanket condemnation of "radical politics" (which does not just include the various wrong-headed groups associated with such acts of violence, but peaceful and sensible political groups outside of the mainstream).
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Postmodern Essay Generator (For LOLs)
Surrealism in the works of Eco
Jean-Luc W. V. Abian
Department of Sociology, University of Illinois
1. Contexts of paradigm
In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the concept of submodern reality. Therefore, the subject is interpolated into a that includes consciousness as a reality.
The main theme of the works of Eco is the bridge between society and class. The primary theme of von Ludwig’s[1] model of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative is the rubicon, and subsequent absurdity, of subcapitalist sexual identity. In a sense, in Foucault’s Pendulum, Eco examines surrealism; in The Island of the Day Before, although, he analyses Sartreist absurdity.
In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the distinction between without and within. The subject is contextualised into a patriarchial paradigm of narrative that includes truth as a paradox. Thus, many theories concerning the difference between narrativity and sexual identity exist.
If one examines deconstructivist construction, one is faced with a choice: either reject surrealism or conclude that language may be used to oppress the underprivileged. La Fournier[2] implies that we have to choose between Sartreist existentialism and textual predialectic theory. In a sense, Marx uses the term ‘Sartreist absurdity’ to denote the role of the observer as reader.
In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the concept of cultural narrativity. The subject is interpolated into a that includes truth as a totality. Thus, the defining characteristic of Sartreist absurdity depicted in Eco’s The Name of the Rose is also evident in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, although in a more dialectic sense.
“Class is part of the genre of narrativity,” says Sontag. If surrealism holds, we have to choose between subcultural discourse and capitalist theory. Therefore, la Tournier[3] states that the works of Eco are reminiscent of Koons.
If one examines Sartreist absurdity, one is faced with a choice: either accept surrealism or conclude that consciousness is capable of truth, given that the premise of Derridaist reading is invalid. Sontag uses the term ’surrealism’ to denote the meaninglessness, and subsequent genre, of postdialectic sexual identity. But a number of materialisms concerning Sartreist absurdity may be revealed.
“Class is meaningless,” says Bataille. Marx suggests the use of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative to challenge sexism. Therefore, Lyotard uses the term ’surrealism’ to denote not narrative, but prenarrative.
In the works of Gibson, a predominant concept is the distinction between opening and closing. The main theme of the works of Gibson is the rubicon, and eventually the failure, of materialist society. In a sense, the subject is contextualised into a that includes culture as a whole.
The patriarchial paradigm of narrative implies that narrativity serves to entrench the status quo. However, several deappropriations concerning not discourse per se, but subdiscourse exist.
Sartre uses the term ‘Sartreist absurdity’ to denote the common ground between sexual identity and class. It could be said that many theories concerning surrealism may be found.
Baudrillard promotes the use of Sartreist absurdity to analyse and attack society. But the primary theme of Pickett’s[4] analysis of surrealism is the role of the poet as observer.
Derrida’s critique of capitalist postcultural theory holds that the collective is part of the fatal flaw of reality, but only if art is distinct from sexuality; if that is not the case, Debord’s model of Sartreist absurdity is one of “Lacanist obscurity”, and thus intrinsically impossible. In a sense, the subject is interpolated into a that includes art as a paradox.
Marx uses the term ‘the patriarchial paradigm of narrative’ to denote not, in fact, deconstruction, but predeconstruction. However, Lacan suggests the use of surrealism to deconstruct class divisions.
The subject is contextualised into a that includes sexuality as a reality. Thus, the example of Sartreist absurdity intrinsic to Gibson’s Pattern Recognition emerges again in All Tomorrow’s Parties.
An abundance of theories concerning a mythopoetical totality exist. But if surrealism holds, we have to choose between Sartreist absurdity and the textual paradigm of discourse.
Lyotard uses the term ‘the patriarchial paradigm of narrative’ to denote not patriarchialism as such, but neopatriarchialism. Therefore, Humphrey[5] suggests that the works of Gibson are an example of self-supporting capitalism.
Foucault promotes the use of surrealism to analyse class. However, the characteristic theme of the works of Gibson is the difference between society and truth.
Postdialectic libertarianism holds that expression must come from the masses. It could be said that the subject is interpolated into a that includes sexuality as a whole.
2. The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and the cultural paradigm of reality
“Sexual identity is unattainable,” says Derrida; however, according to McElwaine[6] , it is not so much sexual identity that is unattainable, but rather the meaninglessness, and some would say the rubicon, of sexual identity. Lacan uses the term ’surrealism’ to denote a subcapitalist reality. Thus, Sartre suggests the use of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative to attack hierarchy.
In Mona Lisa Overdrive, Gibson affirms surrealism; in Idoru he examines materialist theory. However, the premise of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative suggests that truth is capable of intention.
The primary theme of Porter’s[7] essay on surrealism is the bridge between class and sexual identity. Thus, the patriarchial paradigm of narrative implies that government is part of the fatal flaw of reality.
The subject is contextualised into a cultural paradigm of reality that includes art as a whole. Therefore, many narratives concerning the patriarchial paradigm of narrative may be discovered.
3. Discourses of defining characteristic
“Society is fundamentally meaningless,” says Derrida. Lyotard promotes the use of the cultural paradigm of reality to challenge and read reality. In a sense, the characteristic theme of the works of Gibson is the role of the poet as writer.
If one examines the patriarchial paradigm of narrative, one is faced with a choice: either reject surrealism or conclude that sexuality may be used to disempower the proletariat, given that the premise of the cultural paradigm of reality is valid. The subject is interpolated into a patriarchial paradigm of narrative that includes culture as a paradox. Thus, surrealism states that reality is responsible for capitalism.
An abundance of theories concerning the common ground between sexual identity and sexuality exist. However, the primary theme of Brophy’s[8] analysis of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative is a mythopoetical totality.
If the cultural paradigm of reality holds, we have to choose between substructuralist discourse and the cultural paradigm of reality. Thus, Sartre uses the term ‘the cultural paradigm of reality’ to denote not theory, but pretheory.
Lyotard suggests the use of surrealism to attack sexist perceptions of society. Therefore, the main theme of the works of Gibson is a postsemioticist whole.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. von Ludwig, J. Q. B. (1983) Consensuses of Absurdity: The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and surrealism. Oxford University Press
2. la Fournier, I. ed. (1976) Surrealism and the patriarchial paradigm of narrative. University of Illinois Press
3. la Tournier, N. K. G. (1998) The Failure of Reality: The patriarchial paradigm of narrative in the works of Gibson. University of California Press
4. Pickett, C. ed. (1983) The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and surrealism. Harvard University Press
5. Humphrey, H. K. (1975) The Economy of Language: Surrealism in the works of Pynchon. Oxford University Press
6. McElwaine, U. ed. (1981) Surrealism and the patriarchial paradigm of narrative. Panic Button Books
7. Porter, T. M. C. (1992) The Collapse of Narrative: The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and surrealism. University of North Carolina Press
8. Brophy, E. ed. (1983) Surrealism and the patriarchial paradigm of narrative. And/Or Press
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The essay you have just seen is completely meaningless and was randomly generated by the Postmodernism Generator. To generate another essay, follow this link.
Jean-Luc W. V. Abian
Department of Sociology, University of Illinois
1. Contexts of paradigm
In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the concept of submodern reality. Therefore, the subject is interpolated into a that includes consciousness as a reality.
The main theme of the works of Eco is the bridge between society and class. The primary theme of von Ludwig’s[1] model of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative is the rubicon, and subsequent absurdity, of subcapitalist sexual identity. In a sense, in Foucault’s Pendulum, Eco examines surrealism; in The Island of the Day Before, although, he analyses Sartreist absurdity.
In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the distinction between without and within. The subject is contextualised into a patriarchial paradigm of narrative that includes truth as a paradox. Thus, many theories concerning the difference between narrativity and sexual identity exist.
If one examines deconstructivist construction, one is faced with a choice: either reject surrealism or conclude that language may be used to oppress the underprivileged. La Fournier[2] implies that we have to choose between Sartreist existentialism and textual predialectic theory. In a sense, Marx uses the term ‘Sartreist absurdity’ to denote the role of the observer as reader.
In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the concept of cultural narrativity. The subject is interpolated into a that includes truth as a totality. Thus, the defining characteristic of Sartreist absurdity depicted in Eco’s The Name of the Rose is also evident in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, although in a more dialectic sense.
“Class is part of the genre of narrativity,” says Sontag. If surrealism holds, we have to choose between subcultural discourse and capitalist theory. Therefore, la Tournier[3] states that the works of Eco are reminiscent of Koons.
If one examines Sartreist absurdity, one is faced with a choice: either accept surrealism or conclude that consciousness is capable of truth, given that the premise of Derridaist reading is invalid. Sontag uses the term ’surrealism’ to denote the meaninglessness, and subsequent genre, of postdialectic sexual identity. But a number of materialisms concerning Sartreist absurdity may be revealed.
“Class is meaningless,” says Bataille. Marx suggests the use of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative to challenge sexism. Therefore, Lyotard uses the term ’surrealism’ to denote not narrative, but prenarrative.
In the works of Gibson, a predominant concept is the distinction between opening and closing. The main theme of the works of Gibson is the rubicon, and eventually the failure, of materialist society. In a sense, the subject is contextualised into a that includes culture as a whole.
The patriarchial paradigm of narrative implies that narrativity serves to entrench the status quo. However, several deappropriations concerning not discourse per se, but subdiscourse exist.
Sartre uses the term ‘Sartreist absurdity’ to denote the common ground between sexual identity and class. It could be said that many theories concerning surrealism may be found.
Baudrillard promotes the use of Sartreist absurdity to analyse and attack society. But the primary theme of Pickett’s[4] analysis of surrealism is the role of the poet as observer.
Derrida’s critique of capitalist postcultural theory holds that the collective is part of the fatal flaw of reality, but only if art is distinct from sexuality; if that is not the case, Debord’s model of Sartreist absurdity is one of “Lacanist obscurity”, and thus intrinsically impossible. In a sense, the subject is interpolated into a that includes art as a paradox.
Marx uses the term ‘the patriarchial paradigm of narrative’ to denote not, in fact, deconstruction, but predeconstruction. However, Lacan suggests the use of surrealism to deconstruct class divisions.
The subject is contextualised into a that includes sexuality as a reality. Thus, the example of Sartreist absurdity intrinsic to Gibson’s Pattern Recognition emerges again in All Tomorrow’s Parties.
An abundance of theories concerning a mythopoetical totality exist. But if surrealism holds, we have to choose between Sartreist absurdity and the textual paradigm of discourse.
Lyotard uses the term ‘the patriarchial paradigm of narrative’ to denote not patriarchialism as such, but neopatriarchialism. Therefore, Humphrey[5] suggests that the works of Gibson are an example of self-supporting capitalism.
Foucault promotes the use of surrealism to analyse class. However, the characteristic theme of the works of Gibson is the difference between society and truth.
Postdialectic libertarianism holds that expression must come from the masses. It could be said that the subject is interpolated into a that includes sexuality as a whole.
2. The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and the cultural paradigm of reality
“Sexual identity is unattainable,” says Derrida; however, according to McElwaine[6] , it is not so much sexual identity that is unattainable, but rather the meaninglessness, and some would say the rubicon, of sexual identity. Lacan uses the term ’surrealism’ to denote a subcapitalist reality. Thus, Sartre suggests the use of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative to attack hierarchy.
In Mona Lisa Overdrive, Gibson affirms surrealism; in Idoru he examines materialist theory. However, the premise of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative suggests that truth is capable of intention.
The primary theme of Porter’s[7] essay on surrealism is the bridge between class and sexual identity. Thus, the patriarchial paradigm of narrative implies that government is part of the fatal flaw of reality.
The subject is contextualised into a cultural paradigm of reality that includes art as a whole. Therefore, many narratives concerning the patriarchial paradigm of narrative may be discovered.
3. Discourses of defining characteristic
“Society is fundamentally meaningless,” says Derrida. Lyotard promotes the use of the cultural paradigm of reality to challenge and read reality. In a sense, the characteristic theme of the works of Gibson is the role of the poet as writer.
If one examines the patriarchial paradigm of narrative, one is faced with a choice: either reject surrealism or conclude that sexuality may be used to disempower the proletariat, given that the premise of the cultural paradigm of reality is valid. The subject is interpolated into a patriarchial paradigm of narrative that includes culture as a paradox. Thus, surrealism states that reality is responsible for capitalism.
An abundance of theories concerning the common ground between sexual identity and sexuality exist. However, the primary theme of Brophy’s[8] analysis of the patriarchial paradigm of narrative is a mythopoetical totality.
If the cultural paradigm of reality holds, we have to choose between substructuralist discourse and the cultural paradigm of reality. Thus, Sartre uses the term ‘the cultural paradigm of reality’ to denote not theory, but pretheory.
Lyotard suggests the use of surrealism to attack sexist perceptions of society. Therefore, the main theme of the works of Gibson is a postsemioticist whole.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. von Ludwig, J. Q. B. (1983) Consensuses of Absurdity: The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and surrealism. Oxford University Press
2. la Fournier, I. ed. (1976) Surrealism and the patriarchial paradigm of narrative. University of Illinois Press
3. la Tournier, N. K. G. (1998) The Failure of Reality: The patriarchial paradigm of narrative in the works of Gibson. University of California Press
4. Pickett, C. ed. (1983) The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and surrealism. Harvard University Press
5. Humphrey, H. K. (1975) The Economy of Language: Surrealism in the works of Pynchon. Oxford University Press
6. McElwaine, U. ed. (1981) Surrealism and the patriarchial paradigm of narrative. Panic Button Books
7. Porter, T. M. C. (1992) The Collapse of Narrative: The patriarchial paradigm of narrative and surrealism. University of North Carolina Press
8. Brophy, E. ed. (1983) Surrealism and the patriarchial paradigm of narrative. And/Or Press
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The essay you have just seen is completely meaningless and was randomly generated by the Postmodernism Generator. To generate another essay, follow this link.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
The Power of Ideas and Words
Libertarians generally tend to think of power in terms of the use of force or in terms of "political power". However, there are layers of power other than "political power", some of which overlap with "political power". It could be said that the most fundamental layer of power is the power of ideas in the sense that people are motivated by ideas, often dedicating their very lives to them (and arguably, sometimes effectively enslaving themselves to them). This is a more fundamental psychologicallevel of power - the power that an idea has over a man, as well as the way in which ideas can be and are used to obtain a more political sense of power over those whom the ideas hold power over (or ideas as a means to power). It is also a partially linguistic matter, since the ideas are associated with certain words, which in turn can function as a means to power.
In conjunction with this, there is the modern phenomenon of identity politics. Identity politics is not a strictly "left" or "right" phenomenon in terms of common political categorizations (in fact, these categorizations themselves could easily be seen a manifestation of identity politics), but a broader phenomenon that encompasses much of mainstream politics in general (as well as certain elements within radical politics sometimes). The way that I'm defining identity politics here, identity politics involves a whole series of political, national, economic, racial and gender categories (in short, the categories of "mass culture" in general) that are used as "floating abstractions" (to use more Randian lingo) that people allow to determine their identity for them (in opposition to any meaningful sense of individuality) and that are consequentially used by people as a means to power.
This could be seen as allowing one's conception of oneself to be dependant on social constructions that one did not create or that contradict one's individuality, which is in some sense beyond such social constructions. Such social constructions may be in conflict with genuine self-assertion and are prone to be used by others as a means to power. The person confuses their identitywith the social construction, and consequentially the person is potentially open to be controlled or more likely to be obedient to authority in some sense when others invoke the social construction. The social construction becomes the authority one appeals to in order to justify power. For example, consider the way in which the nationality of "America" is often used to justify just about any kind of political power - appeals to patriotism and invokations of nationalism are among the oldest tricks in the book as far as legitimizing power goes. And the matter is hardly restricted to just nationalism.
An extended analysis of this opens up an entire (and much neglected) area of inquiry for libertarians, one that touches more explicitly on psychology and epistemology. It also seems to indicate that the sense of individualism that libertarianism entails and is grounded upon is broader than has often traditionally been thought. There is a sense in which it should be a goal of libertarians to demystify such social constructions when one considers the degree to which power has historically and contemporaneously been intertwined with them. It could be said that any social construction can potentially be used in such a way, although some have been and are used more than others and not all social constructions necessarily function in such a way. Nonetheleess, while not all social constructions are "equal" in this sense and it may be wrong to indiscriminately condemnall social constructions, the fact that social constructions and the language associated with them can and have had a power-serving function seems fairly certain.
In conjunction with this, there is the modern phenomenon of identity politics. Identity politics is not a strictly "left" or "right" phenomenon in terms of common political categorizations (in fact, these categorizations themselves could easily be seen a manifestation of identity politics), but a broader phenomenon that encompasses much of mainstream politics in general (as well as certain elements within radical politics sometimes). The way that I'm defining identity politics here, identity politics involves a whole series of political, national, economic, racial and gender categories (in short, the categories of "mass culture" in general) that are used as "floating abstractions" (to use more Randian lingo) that people allow to determine their identity for them (in opposition to any meaningful sense of individuality) and that are consequentially used by people as a means to power.
This could be seen as allowing one's conception of oneself to be dependant on social constructions that one did not create or that contradict one's individuality, which is in some sense beyond such social constructions. Such social constructions may be in conflict with genuine self-assertion and are prone to be used by others as a means to power. The person confuses their identitywith the social construction, and consequentially the person is potentially open to be controlled or more likely to be obedient to authority in some sense when others invoke the social construction. The social construction becomes the authority one appeals to in order to justify power. For example, consider the way in which the nationality of "America" is often used to justify just about any kind of political power - appeals to patriotism and invokations of nationalism are among the oldest tricks in the book as far as legitimizing power goes. And the matter is hardly restricted to just nationalism.
An extended analysis of this opens up an entire (and much neglected) area of inquiry for libertarians, one that touches more explicitly on psychology and epistemology. It also seems to indicate that the sense of individualism that libertarianism entails and is grounded upon is broader than has often traditionally been thought. There is a sense in which it should be a goal of libertarians to demystify such social constructions when one considers the degree to which power has historically and contemporaneously been intertwined with them. It could be said that any social construction can potentially be used in such a way, although some have been and are used more than others and not all social constructions necessarily function in such a way. Nonetheleess, while not all social constructions are "equal" in this sense and it may be wrong to indiscriminately condemnall social constructions, the fact that social constructions and the language associated with them can and have had a power-serving function seems fairly certain.
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
Insurrection vs. Pacifism: A False Dillema
There is a general traditional strategic split among anarchists between insurrectionary anarchism and pacifist anarchism. Insurrection is generally associated with either individual or public violent revolution, although if one wants to be specific it is etymologically linked closely with the concept of an "insurgent", and an "insurgency" could be seen as a spontaneous defensive response to an initial invasion by a political and/or military power (like the "insurgency" in Iraq, for example). On the other hand, pacifist anarchists completely reject any degree or kind of violence, likely viewing it as inconsistent and hypocritical, and this is more than just a strategic question for absolutist pacifists because they reject self-defense as a matter of principle.However, it would be decieving to assume that these are the only two possible options. Reasonable arguments could be given against both of them and they could be constrasted from an explicitly "libertarian anarchism" that makes a clear distinction between defense and arbitrary violence. On one hand, pacifism can be criticized on the grounds that it doesn't make any room for defense and it consequentially leaves one in a submissive position relative to power; rulers aren't likely to just voluntarily give up their power, especially when there isn't even a moderate threat of resistance. On the other hand, the traditional violent revolution can be critisized on the grounds that it threatens to undermine the end that it is a means towards and often just leads to a vangaurd state; arbitrary violence contradicts the principles that one is "fighting for" to begin with and is not likely to lead to the goal of a free society.
For a hasty insurrectionist, violence is the first resort, while for a libertarian anarchist, violence is more of a last resort of defense in comparison (there is a difference between defending yourself in the face of a police state and simply taking people out arbitrarily), and the kind of measures supported by some insurrectionists definitely crosses well over the line of defense and into the realm of assassination and rioting. From a libertarian perspective, it is hard to see how simply storming city hall and shooting the place up like it's Duke Nukem is reasonable or consistent. Aside from the possible horrors that may be endorsed by an insurrectionist as a means, the main problem that an insurrectionist faces is the question of how to avoid the phenomenon of the revoltionists becoming the new power center. Instead of "the new society in the shell of the old", there are valid concerns about "the new power center in the shell of the old". While insurrectionary anarchism is contrasted from marxist vangaurd statism on a certain level, there still may be a context in which such a distinction essentially breaks down.The conundrum of the pacifist is sort of the opposite one: namely, that when it does come down to a question of defending oneself in the face of aggression, pacifism constrains the individual to the point of powerlessness. There are certain situations in which peaceful resistance will simply be crushed with violence, and in this sense pacifism is simply suicidal as a strategy. While the argument that anarchism could only work if everyone in the world agreed or if everyone was perfectly peaceful is not valid, it may be valid as an argument against pacifism in the sense that pacifism offers no real means to counter violence when it comes down to the nitty gritty of situations in which people use violence; that is, it could be viewed as giving carte blanch power to those who do use violence precisely because organized resistance to it is prohibited to everyone else (by their own code even).
With that being said, this should not be construed to imply that violence is necessarily the only way to counter power - I think that is too pessemistic and Hobbesian of a view. There are numerous non-violent ways to counter power that can potentially have an effect, particularly if one is focusing on the long-term. At a meta level, the most basic of these ways to combat power is a matter of philosophy and ideas, by not allowing the ideological constructs of power to hold weight for you and to spread the demystification of such ideological constructs. On another level, another way to combat power is through a myriad of forms of civil disobedience, which can potentially be effective if the proper precautions are taken. There *is* a certain extent that there's a sense in which power is dependant on compliance or asequiesance, and power can be sterilized sometimes through sheer lack of consensus and compliance. And to put the matter in positive terms, one can combat power through association to foster competition with power and more of a degree of self-reliance that lessens one's unchosen dependancies on power.However, one shouldn't take too idealistic of a view of the matter either. Power does not dissapear overnight and in some sense anarchism is inherently a long-term project. The traditional notion of revolution can be critisized for precisely this reason, I.E. that it naively expects a singular violent uprising to dissolve power. It doesn't really work that way. On the other hand, the notion of a purely peaceful process seems naive when one considers the likelyhood (or lack thereof) of those in power to cooperating with those who wish to dismantle their power. When it actually does come down to one being explicitly threatened with violence, it seems like violent resistance is essentially the only way to counter it, and a pacifist is simply a sitting duck in such situations for the obvious reasons already mentioned. This is why a "3rd way" makes more sense than either pacifism or insurrectionism.
The matter could be thought of in terms of an anarchist contextualization of Neitzsche's dichotomy between "master morality" and "slave morality". One could say that the masses tend to embrace and follow a "slave morality" that restrains them from engaging in self-assertion while those in power tend to embrace and follow a "master morality" that gives them free reign of self-assertion (although there is a sense in which this does not absolutely hold - there are people in power who genuinely believe in a "slave morality" but are working within an institution of "master morality", and not all of "the masses" believe in a strict "slave morality"), and the combined effect of this is that "slave morality" actually has the function of enabling the master class in that it tends to render the masses powerless by virtue of their own moral dogma.
But I would say then that the purpose should not be to expand "master morality" to everyone but to overcome and transcend both "slave morality" and "master morality". By analogy, pacifism is "slave morality" and insurrectionism is "slave morality" manifested as "master morality". In the context of the state, something like state-socialism could be seen as "slave morality manifested as master morality". The problem isn't restricted to "slave morality" but to the dualistic paradigm itself. "Master morality" as it is actually generally manifested in politics is an outwardly-oriented form of self-assertion in the sense of dominating the lives of others, which is not the same thing as a more inward form of self-assertion in the sense of genuine self-improvement or concern with one's long-range interest. So I would say that both "slave morality" and "master morality" suffer from the same fundamental problem; they are both, in some sense, not "properly egoistic".
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